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If  each of  these Civilitas end-
of–the-year summaries had been 
intended to serve as a window to 
the policies, events and trends of  
the last year, this year’s report is 
almost a guide to opportunities 
lost and opportunities that still lie 
ahead. If  there was a single unify-
ing theme to 2011, it was confu-
sion, frustration and anxiety, all 
around the globe. This was cou-
pled with the loss of  any lingering 
illusions, as the world marked the 
20th anniversary of  the collapse 
of  the Soviet Union.
Further, in 2011, there was a new imperative to 
review and rethink the economic and political 
assumptions that form the foundation of some of 
the Western world’s greatest powers. 
While still in the midst of a deep economic crisis, 
US public and political circles began to angst 
over the tenets of the American economic and 
political institutions. The European Union, too, will 
continue for months and years to agonize about the 
essence and nature of that union, and the new fiscal 
and political creed that will be required to sustain it.
The deliberations extended beyond the West and 
even beyond deliberation. In the Arab world, anger 
and hope combined to bring an awakening and a 
search for a democratic future. In Asia, political 
and economic uncertainties were given voice. Even 
in Russia, the end of 2011 saw the beginnings of a 
public search for a shared vision of a 21st century 
Russia.
But in the 20-year-old Republic of Armenia, the 
historic anniversary came and went with no search 
for new political answers to society’s economic ills, 
no urge to move forward with additional reforms, 
no talk of austerity and debt, no compulsion to 
compete with the neighbors. 
Instead there was silence. Not only was there no 
mood for revolution, there was not even a concerted 
push for political evolution. Those who voiced 
dissatisfaction with the status quo and the need for 
change did not have, or did not believe they had, the 
means to make change possible.
In a Civilitas poll, conducted in the fall, two-thirds 
of those queried across the country said they would 
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vote again to leave the Soviet Union. For them, 
and even for the one-third whose disappointments 
clearly approach regret, some things are assumed 
to be irreversible. Those are personal freedoms: 
the right to free movement, the hope for gender 
equality, the right to speech and to worship, the 
right to a minimal standard of living and to basic 
health and education. 
These are the ideals taken for granted by the 
independence generation. They still do not know 
how to strategize, organize, make change or make 
policy, but they do know they have rights and have 
no fears about exercising those rights.
Possibly best of all, they have no illusions. They have 
seen difficult years. In that same Civilitas poll, it was 
the 20 to 40 year olds, and the 60+ year olds who 
were most optimistic. Perhaps the promises, the 
realities, the uncertainties of the last several years 
will give way to a new year, without illusions, but 
with hope.
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For most of  2011, the revolutions 
in Tunisia and Egypt in January-
February and the protracted crises 
in Libya and Syria preoccupied the 
international community, deflected 
attention from the Caucasus and 
created a window of  opportunity 
that Azerbaijan, Georgia and Tur-
key each sought to exploit.
 
 
 
 
 
Armenia and its neighbors remained adrift and 
outside international focus, due also in part to the 
continuing global economic crisis. For Europe the  
crisis was also political and consequently, Europe’s 
availability for broader engagement in its eastern 
neighborhood diminished. Major international 
policy initiatives in the region, such as the push for 
Georgia’s NATO integration and Armenia-Turkey 
normalization, effectively stalled. 
In 2011, Russia continued to play a pre-eminent 
power role in the Caucasus and its leaders made 
several key pronouncements to accentuate this 
reality. 
In October, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 
proposed a post-Soviet free trade zone and the 
establishment of a Eurasian Union, both initiatives 
publicly welcomed by Armenian officials.  
Speaking at the United Nations in September, 
Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that 
Russia was ready to be the “guarantor” of “non-use 
of force” in the Caucasus.
And in an August interview with Georgian 
journalists timed to coincide with the third 
anniversary of the 2008 war over South Ossetia, 
President Dmitry Medvedev said that the leaders of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan had acknowledged that for 
them, the war was a “lesson” in what to avoid.
The Russian-backed candidate in South Ossetia 
lost in both rounds of the November presidential 
election. The winning candidate’s supporters hit 
the streets to defend their votes. Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court of South Ossetia annulled the ballot 
and called for new elections in March, when the 
current winner will be able to run again.
The March date coincides with the Russian 
presidential election in which Prime Minister 
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Putin is the expected winner. However, during the 
December 2011 parliamentary election in Russia, 
Putin’s party received less votes than expected. The 
results wer contested on the streets by activists 
and voters who insisted that even that vote was 
exaggerated and rigged. 
Armenia and its neighbors remained 
adrift and outside international 
focus, due in part to the continuing 
global economic crisis
In Turkey, the move to write a new constitution 
was the culmination of the ruling Justice and 
Development Party’s systemic (and successful) 
campaign to exclude the army from influencing 
domestic politics, and prevent it from instigating 
coups d’etat. The army, which had been considered 
the guarantor of the Turkish Republic’s secular 
identity, remained under judicial attack as its 
generals were arrested and brought before the courts 
for inciting violence, or being party to conspiracies. 
These cases, bundled under the name Ergenekon, 
also continue to affect the judicial process to 
identify and convict those responsible for the 
assassination of Hrant Dink, in January 2007. Thus, 
the unraveling of Turkey’s internal political power 
bonds will directly impact the role of individual 
Armenians and Armenian community institutions 
in Turkey.
On another taboo topic, the Turkish prime minister, 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, made an extraordinary 
announcement. He publicly apologized for the 
massacres that had taken place in 1937-38 in 
Dersim, in  Central Turkey, where on orders of 
Kemal Ataturk, the founder and then-president of 
the modern Turkish Republic, more than 10,000 
Kurds were killed by Turkish soldiers. The Erdogan  
apology followed the arrests, in large numbers, of 
Kurdish activists and sympathizers, possibly in a 
show of force in the face of new military clashes 
between Turkish soldiers and Kurdish factions in 
southeastern Turkey. The mass detentions were 
denounced by many inside Turkey as well, coming 
as they did at the end of an election season where 
the party of Erdogan adopted a harsher and more 
nationalistic tone which, critics said, alienated 
many Kurds. The combination of the Dersim 
apology which left Ataturk in a negative context, 
the continuing nationalist rhetoric, and the easing 
of restrictions on minorities may be part of an AKP 
strategy to set itself up as a legitimate ideological 
force entitled to initiate major constitutional 
changes.
2011 witnessed a concerted push by Azerbaijan 
to parlay its hydrocarbon resources and wealth 
into status and recognition as a regional power. 
Azerbaijan’s election in October as a non-
permanent member of the UN Security Council 
was the manifestation of that strategy.
That strategy has been the impetus for a more 
assertive stance by Baku in its dealings with 
Moscow, Tehran and Ankara. Azerbaijan also plans 
to increase investments in Turkey and Georgia 
and to start investing in Russia’s North Caucasus 
republics. 
This thrust by Azerbaijan has pushed Georgia to 
embrace the opportunities inherent in deepening 
its “strategic partnership” with Azerbaijan and 
thus overlook what used to be irritants in bilateral 
relations (such as the disputed status of the 
medieval David Garedja monastery situated on the 
border between the two countries.)
A measure of the extent of bilateral economic 
cooperation is the fact that Azerbaijan’s state oil 
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company SOCAR was in 2010, and probably is 
for 2011 as well, Georgia’s largest taxpayer. In June, 
Baku extended a $575 million credit to Georgia to 
finance construction of the Georgian section of the 
Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway, which was conceived to 
circumvent an existing Kars-Gyumri-Tbilisi link, 
but which continues to lag behind schedule.
Pragmatic partnership remains the hallmark of 
Azerbaijan’s relations with the Russian government, 
even as it acts with greater assertiveness vis-à-vis the 
weak and ineffective leadership of Daghestan, to the 
north.  
Azerbaijan signed a new agreement in January 
with Russia’s Gazprom on the sale in 2011 of two  
billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas – more 
than double the amount Azerbaijan supplied to 
Russia the previous year, but modest compared 
with the 10 bcm expected to come on line in 2017. 
Russia expressed readiness to buy the entire supply, 
attempting to undercut the ambitious Nabucco 
supply circumventing Russia. 
In August, the Russian Defense Minister visited 
Baku for the start of talks on extending the lease 
and modernizing the Gabala radar station in central 
Azerbaijan. The 10-year lease is due to expire in 
December 2012.
Azerbaijan proved less accommodating in its 
handling of the problem of resettling to Daghestan 
of some 450 Russian families living in two villages 
in northern Azerbaijan that were de facto Russian 
exclaves until the signing in September 2010 of the 
Russian-Azerbaijani agreement demarcating the 
border between the two countries. A solution was 
reached only after the Russian government agreed 
to fund the resettlement of the effected families, 
who had to forfeit without compensation their 
homes on what is now Azerbaijani territory.
In early October, the Russian presidential envoy to 
the North Caucasus Federal District, together with 
the heads of the North Caucasus republics, travelled 
to Baku to try to interest Azerbaijani investors 
in a multitude of long-term projects in the agro-
industrial and energy sectors and in the planned 
development of a string of resorts on Daghestan’s 
Caspian coast.
The Turkish prime minister publicly 
apologized for the massacres that 
had taken place in 1937-38 in 
Dersim, in  Central Turkey
In January, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev 
signed a declaration with visiting European 
Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso 
affirming Azerbaijan’s commitment to export 
“substantial volumes” of its natural gas to the 
European Union via Turkey. While that declaration 
served to enhance Azerbaijan’s standing vis-à-vis the 
EU, the decision on the choice of export pipeline(s) 
for the so-called Southern Corridor remained 
contingent on Azerbaijan reaching agreement with 
Turkey on the legal and commercial terms for that 
transit, specifically the volume of gas Turkey will 
receive and the price it will pay. That agreement 
was finalized only in late October after talks lasting 
several years. 
The entire process pointed to bilateral Azerbaijani-
Turkish problems despite the publicly professed 
brotherhood between the two countries. There 
are other problems as well. Azerbaijan has still not 
reciprocated the abolition by Turkey of its visa 
requirement for Azerbaijani citizens, apparently 
because Baku is reluctant to abolish visas just for 
Turkey without doing so with Iran, with which its 
relations remain tense. 
A REGION IN FLUX
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The two countries exchanged diplomatic notes,  in 
protest, following the shooting of an Azerbaijani 
serviceman on the frontier in July, and the 
characterization, in August, by the Iranian Armed 
Forces Chief of Staff of President Aliyev’s policies as 
“anti-Islamic” and pro-Israel.
2011 witnessed a concerted push 
by Azerbaijan to parlay its 
hydrocarbon resources and wealth 
into status and recognition as a 
regional power. Azerbaijan’s election 
in October as a non-permanent 
member of  the UN Security Council 
was the manifestation of  that 
strategy
The antagonism between Russia and Georgia 
worsened too, with Georgia continuing to allege 
Russian espionage and other subversive activities on 
its territory. In early July, the Georgian authorities 
arrested four photo journalists, three of whom 
were charged with spying for Russia. They were 
found guilty but after plea bargaining were given 
suspended sentences and released. This followed 
the strict sentencing, in July, of nine (including two 
Armenian) people arrested in Batumi in October 
2010 and similarly charged with spying for Russia.
Following six rounds of talks during which Georgia 
continued to block Russia’s application for World 
Trade Organization membership, in late October, 
under increasing pressure from both the US and 
the EU, Tbilisi endorsed a compromise solution 
proposed by Switzerland, and which Russia too 
accepted. This will entail the deployment of 
international observers to monitor the transit of 
goods between the Russian Federation and Georgia 
via Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Georgia pushed ahead with its efforts to win 
hearts and minds in the North Caucasus. The 
Georgian parliament voted overwhelmingly in 
May to designate as genocide the wholesale killing 
or expulsion from their Black seacoast homeland 
of the Circassians by Tsarist Russian troops in the 
1860s. Armenians took note that the Armenian 
Genocide of 1915 has not yet been acknowledged 
by the Georgian government.
In July, the Georgian authorities organized 
a conference in Tbilisi, to which academics 
and journalists from the North Caucasus 
republics were invited, to showcase Georgia’s 
successful implementation of economic reform, 
democratization and eradicating corruption. 
In its relations with Turkey, Georgia’s extreme 
sensitivity to any perceived disrespect for its 
national patrimony continues to take second 
place to the benefits of political and economic 
pragmatism. Armenia understands this well, given 
its own similar sensitivity in Armenian-Georgian 
relations. 
In late May, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili 
and the Turkish Prime Minister jointly inaugurated 
the updated Sarp border crossing between the two 
countries. They also signed an agreement that takes 
one step further the 2007 agreement on visa-free 
travel between them, making it possible to cross 
the border at Sarp on production of a national 
identity card. Turkish businessmen continue to seek 
investment opportunities in Adjaria, and elsewhere 
in southern Georgia. 
As senior partner in the relationship, Turkey risked 
incurring Georgian displeasure by approving a 
private visit in April by Sergei Bagapsh, then-de 
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facto leader of the breakaway Republic of Abkhazia, 
during which Bagapsh met with representatives 
of Turkey’s Abkhaz diaspora, which outnumbers 
Abkhazia’s own population. The Georgian Foreign 
Ministry did not lodge a formal protest.
Bilateral talks continue on Georgia’s request for 
permission to restore several medieval Georgian 
churches on what is now Turkish territory. Georgia 
has sought to use to best advantage what limited 
leverage it has over Ankara, delaying the release of a 
Turkish merchant vessel, the Afro Star, intercepted 
in the summer of 2009 in Georgian territorial 
waters en route for Turkey from Abkhazia.
Iran’s ATA airlines has begun twice-weekly flights 
between Tehran and Tbilisi following Georgia’s 
overtures in 2010 to Tehran, including the abolition 
of visa requirements for travel between the two 
countries and the opening of an Iranian consulate in 
Batumi.
In the North Caucasus, Russia continues to balance 
the use of force against the Islamic insurgency 
with plans to invest more, and more effectively, in 
projects intended to galvanize local economies and 
create thousands of new jobs, including as service 
personnel in a string of high-end ski resorts in 
which French and South Korean companies have 
shown interest.
In February, President Medvedev proposed 
Ramzan Kadyrov to serve a second term as 
Chechen Republic head, thus effectively reinforcing 
Kadyrov’s status as the most powerful political 
figure in the region. But disagreements within the 
Russian cabinet over funding have delayed the 
adoption of a planned grandiose development 
program. 
Despite the loss of at least a dozen senior 
commanders, the North Caucasus insurgency 
remains a force to be reckoned with. A suicide 
bomber from Ingushetia dispatched to Moscow 
by self-styled Caucasus Emirate head Doku 
Umarov killed three dozen people at Moscow’s 
Domodedovo airport in January. Two senior 
Chechen commanders who split with Umarov last 
year again pledged allegiance to him during the 
summer and launched a three-man attack in Grozny 
in late August, killing nearly 40.
ARMENIA – IRAN
2011 demonstrated the paradox of Armenian-
Iranian relations. A year devoid of any notable 
interaction or bilateral accomplishment nevertheless 
served to reinforce that the Republic of Armenia 
and the Islamic Republic of Iran have exemplary 
bilateral relations. This is predicated on each side’s 
willingness to satisfy the minimum requirements of 
the other.
Over the last 20 years, none of the events in and 
around the region, including wars, change of 
governments or economic and political crises were 
able to shake the foundation of this reciprocal 
understanding.
That Iran is essential for Armenia was proven at least 
twice in the last 20 years – first in the early years, 
1991 to 1994, during the military conflict over 
Nagorno Karabakh, and the second in 2008, during 
the Russian-Georgian war. Both events confirmed 
that  Armenia’s only reliable access to the world was 
through Iran. 
Although Iran’s reliance on Armenia is far less, 
nevertheless Iran appreciates Armenia’s consistent 
adherence to a policy of non-instrumentalizing 
its bilateral relations.  In its turn, Iran maintains 
a position of positive neutrality vis-a-vis the 
A REGION IN FLUX
12
THE CIVILITAS FOUNDATION ARMENIA  2011
Karabakh conflict, and also adheres to an even-
handed approach in its bilateral relations with both 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. This neutral, balanced 
approach is driven entirely by Iran’s own national 
interests.  
Although Iran’s reliance on 
Armenia is far less, nevertheless 
Iran appreciates Armenia’s 
consistent adherence to a policy of  
non-instrumentalizing its bilateral 
relations
Iran is often impelled by Islamic solidarity to 
support Azerbaijan on various international votes. 
At the same time, given that Iran and Karabakh de 
facto share a border, Iran cooperates with Karabakh 
on agricultural programs.  
Various Armenia-Iran economic programs have 
been put in place these 20 years. Certain new 
programs which were to have reinforced bilateral 
economic and therefore political relations have not 
moved forward, however. The Iran-Armenia gas 
pipeline and the two 220-kw high voltage electricity 
transmission stations were the last two significant 
programs. The other programs which would have 
regional significance – two hydro electric power 
plants on the Arax River, the Armenia-Iran railway, 
an oil refinery on the Armenian-Iranian border 
in Armenia’s southern city of Meghri, a pipeline 
bringing refined oil from Iran to Armenia, and the 
construction of an oil storage facility all remain on 
the drawing boards, although some of them were to 
have begun this year. 
Western governments do not encourage Armenian-
Iranian economic ventures that might have regional 
implications and  go counter to the policy of trying 
to isolate Iran. On the other hand, given Armenia’s 
geographic reality and the continuing blockade 
of Armenia by Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia is 
not at the receiving end of serious American and 
European pressure, aware as they are of Armenia’s 
limited options. Nor have the international 
sanctions on Iran had any real effect on Armenian-
Iranian business ventures, trade or other bilateral 
programs.  
Armenia’s trade with Iran does not exceed $300 
million, most of which consists of Armenian 
imports of Iranian goods. Armenia exports 
electricity, wood, foodstuffs and mining products at 
an annual volume of around $50 million.  
Armenia’s President Serzh Sargsyan visited Tehran 
during the Iranian government’s second annual 
international Novruz celebrations. Of nearly 
two dozen invited heads of state, Sargsyan was 
there together with four others -- the leaders of 
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s June 
visit was postponed at the last moment because the 
Iranian side claimed the Armenian side had not 
prepared the necessary bilateral documents to be 
signed. That visit was expected to take place before 
the end of the year.  
There were reciprocal visits by the foreign ministers 
as well as a visit to Armenia by Iran’s deputy defense 
minister. President Ahmadinejad’s Special Envoy 
twice visited Yerevan. In May, the Armenian-
Iranian Intergovernmental Commission held its 
10th session in Tehran. In the fall, in Meghri, at 
the Armenian border with Iran, the two countries 
held Days of Friendship, on the occasion of the 
20th anniversary of the establishment of Armenian-
Iranian diplomatic relations. 
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But the visits most worthy of note were those made 
by tens of thousands of Iranian tourists, who now 
choose to vacation in Armenia throughout the year. 
ARMENIA-GEORGIA
Georgia and Armenia have survived a range of 
political and international upheavals over these 
two decades, despite the fact that two fundamental 
obstacles stand in the way of deeper political and 
economic cooperation and integration. 
The first of those are the acrimonious Georgian-
Russian relations; the second are the unresolved 
conflicts in the South Caucasus.
In the South Caucasus, the Armenian alliance with 
Russia is reason enough for Georgia to consider 
Armenia a potential danger, despite the fact that in 
its darkest hours, including during the August 2008 
war, Armenia demonstrated positive neutrality. The 
Georgians harbored similar reservations regarding 
the Armenian-populated Georgian Javakheti region, 
although that area, of all of Georgia’s regions, has 
seen the least turmoil since Georgia’s independence.
The second factor is the problem of unresolved 
conflicts in the Caucasus. Georgia is, in principle, 
opposed to the idea of the right of the people of 
Nagorno Karabakh to self-determination, and at 
each opportunity stands at Azerbaijan’s side in that 
matter. Although Armenia recognizes Georgia’s 
territorial integrity, Tbilisi is still suspicious when 
Armenia’s Ministry of Education sends Armenian 
language textbooks to Armenian schools in 
Abkhazia. Armenian citizens who entered Abkhazia 
at the Abkhaz-Russian checkpoint were arrested 
when they later entered Georgia and were accused 
of illegally crossing the border. Although these are 
simply expressions of state policy, each such incident 
compounds reciprocal distrust and the perception 
of enmity between the populations.
Although these are the two main areas of divergence 
and dispute, there are other problems too which do 
not help to reinforce bilateral relations.
•	 The continuing Armenian-Azerbaijani 
conflict, in the face of ever-deepening 
Georgian-Azerbaijani strategic 
cooperation
•	 The absence of Armenian-Turkish 
relations, in the face of high-level 
Georgian-Turkish dialogue
•	 Turkish and Azerbaijani efforts to 
distance Armenia from regional energy 
and communication projects, and 
Georgia’s indirect complicity in Armenia’s 
de-facto isolation
•	 Georgia’s discriminatory policies towards 
Javakheti and other Armenian-populated 
areas, manifested in the lack of care and 
attention given to the Armenian language 
and Armenian historic monuments  
•	 For 15 years, efforts to demarcate 
the Armenian-Georgian border have 
remained incomplete
All Armenian and Georgian presidents have 
made reciprocal visits, as have the spiritual heads 
of the respective churches. Indeed, 2011 began 
with President Saakashvili’s visit, in the first days 
of January, to the historically Armenian district 
of Havlabar in Tbilisi and the Holy Etchmiadzin 
Church where he delivered Christmas wishes 
to Armenians on Armenian Christmas. This 
gesture was especially well-received since it was 
accompanied by a message about “thousands 
of years of friendship and brotherhood” and 
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an “exceptional historic example” of how two 
neighboring peoples can help each other in complex 
historic and geographic circumstances.
In the South Caucasus, the 
Armenian alliance with Russia 
is reason enough for Georgia to 
consider Armenia a potential danger, 
despite the fact that in its darkest 
hours, including during the August 
2008 war, Armenia demonstrated 
positive neutrality
This visit was highly symbolic in the context of  
continuing tensions surrounding the status of the 
Armenian Apostolic Church in Georgia and the 
issue of six Armenian churches in Tbilisi and one 
in Akhaltsikhe. It appeared that the issue had been 
resolved during the summer when appropriate 
changes were made to the Civil Code thus enabling 
the five religious organizations in Georgia, 
including the Armenian Apostolic Church, to 
gain the status of a legal entity. The legislation was 
accompanied by a huge wave of anti-Armenian 
sentiment from all segments of the Georgian public, 
including clerics. 
Thousands took to the streets in protest after the 
Parliament approved the legislative changes. The 
Patriarch of the Georgian Orthodox Church, Ilia 
II, chastised those who had thus ‘belittled’ the 
Georgian Church. Another cleric cursed those 
parliamentarians who voted in favor of the measure. 
The decision, made under pressure by European 
structures, was welcomed by the Mother See of 
Holy Etchmiadzin which continued to be the target 
of all Georgian church criticism.
Following the passage of the legislation, the 
Georgian Orthodox Church made occasional 
statements about possibly establishing a diocese 
in Armenia, which Armenian law allows. It does 
appear however that the attempt is a desire to 
establish a quid pro quo – in order to barter 
ownership of Armenian churches in Georgia against 
Georgia’s claims of ownership of five orthodox 
churches in Armenia’s north. 
Although church-related issues were apparent  
throughout 2011, the other controversy – 
over differing, sometimes conflicting votes in 
international organizations – continued to be a 
problem. Armenia not only voted against Georgia 
in the UN General Assembly resolution on 
deportees and refugees from Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, but the vote was held in NY on the same 
day when Armenia’s foreign minister was in Tbilisi. 
The Armenian vote came despite a written request 
from the Georgian government that Armenia 
change its traditional stance this time. Although 
Armenia has no obligation to vote with Georgia, 
especially given Georgia’s consistent votes against 
Armenia and in favor of Azerbaijan, nevertheless if 
Armenia were to abstain, this would give it the right 
to ask and expect a similar position from Georgia in 
Karabakh-related resolutions. Finally, by abstaining, 
Armenia would find itself with the majority of the 
world’s countries and not with North Korea and 
Sudan.
In mid-April, one day after a visit to Armenia  
by Georgia’s Defense Minister, the Georgian 
Parliament voted to rescind the 2006 treaty 
with Russia which also regulated personnel and 
armaments transport thru Georgia to Russia’s 
102nd military base, in Armenia. This treaty had 
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de facto ceased to be relevant following the August 
2008 war.  
This can be viewed in the context of Yerevan and 
Tbilisi’s membership in differing security systems. 
Armenia is a member of the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization, formed and led by Russia. 
Georgia aspires to NATO. Despite this and other 
differing political, there is some Yerevan-Tbilisi 
military cooperation. For example, Armenia and 
Georgia cooperate in peacekeeping (in Afghanistan 
and Kosovo) and in military exercises within NATO. 
A series of official meetings took place throughout 
2011. President Saakashvili visited Armenia in late 
January. Despite public statements about bilateral 
discussions aimed at facilitating border crossing 
and easing customs procedures, such steps were not 
visible by year’s end. 
In mid-February, the Georgian Prime Minister 
visited Armenia and sounded assurances that the 
north-south gas pipeline management portfolio 
would not be sold. Azerbaijan has expressed an 
interest in purchasing this pipeline which transports 
Russian gas to Armenia.  
Just a week later, Georgia’s foreign minister came 
to Armenia which he had  Armenian-Georgian 
relations as ‘de-facto strategic cooperation.’ This 
statement does not receive commensurate effort 
by the leadership of the two sides, although such 
cooperation is possible in the Caucasus, and in the 
context of the existing power balance. 
In November, Georgia’s foreign minister again 
visited Armenia, and Armenia’s prime minister 
traveled to Georgia.  
Georgia remains Armenia’s major transit route. 
Georgian railways and ports carry 70 percent of 
Armenia’s imports and exports. Armenian-Turkish 
trade, too, one-sided though it is, travels through 
Georgia. 
In a rare cross-border cooperation effort, a trans-
boundary national park in the South Caucasus 
is being planned for 2015, with support by the 
Caucasus Nature Fund, to include Javakheti 
National Park in Georgia and Lake Arpi National 
Park across the border in northwestern Armenia.
Finally, Tbilisi and Yerevan may be the only two 
neighboring capitals in the world without reliable, 
consistent flights. 
ARMENIA - TURKEY
In 2011, not only did Armenia-Turkey relations 
return to the early days of 2008, prior to the 
begining of football diplomacy, but even mid-level 
contacts that used to take place among foreign 
ministry officials, ceased. Worse, a series of blunt 
statements during the year served to further 
muddy the Armenia-Turkey waters. This was a far 
cry from 2009 and 2010 when Yerevan, Ankara 
and the international community were hopeful 
that two protocols would be signed to establish 
diplomatic relations and address a host of bilateral 
disagreements. Following Turkey’s insistence on 
positive movement on the Karabakh issue prior to 
ratifying the protocols, relations did not just freeze, 
but worsened.
The year started off ominously when Turkish 
Prime Minister Erdogan visited Kars. During a 
January visit he called the Statue of Humanity, in 
Kars, a ‘monstrosity.’ In 2004, Nayif Alebeyoglu, 
a former mayor of Kars and a strong advocate 
of improved relations between Armenia and 
Turkey, had collected some 50,000 signatures (in a 
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population of 90,000) supporting the opening of 
the Armenia-Turkey border. The statue was his idea 
and it represented ‘friendship and peace’ between 
Armenians and Turks.
Four months after Erdogan’s criticism, the statue 
was taken down. Despite Turkish Foreign Minister 
Ahmet Davutoglu’s assurance that the statue’s 
removal was in no way related to Armenia-Turkey 
relations, still, the entire episode was seen as the 
symbolic end to football diplomacy. Even the 
sculptor of the piece joined the debate. If the statue 
goes down, he said, Erdogan will be like the Taliban. 
And when the actual destruction began, he accused 
Turkish authorities of  “destroying the hope for 
peace.” 
Following Turkey’s insistence on 
positive movement on the Karabakh 
issue prior to ratifying the protocols, 
relations did not just freeze, but 
worsened
In May, during the Parliamentary election campaign 
period, Erdogan visited another Turkish city near 
the Armenian border. In Igdir, he declared that 
Ankara would not improve relations with Armenia 
so long as the Karabakh conflict remains unresolved.
The Turkish linkage between Turkey-Armenia 
relations and the resolution of the Karabakh 
conflict was repeated throughout the year by various 
high-level officials. At the Council of Europe in 
April, Davutoglu went so far as to condemn the 
reconstruction of an airport in Karabakh’s capital, 
Stepanakert, stressing that “such provocative actions 
do not benefit the settlement process.”
The statements coming from Yerevan and especially 
Ankara left the impression that no one regretted 
the demise of the Armenia-Turkey process. 
Diplomacy appeared to have been replaced by 
propaganda and sometimes insolence. The most 
vivid expression of such insolence was the Turkish 
response to a Sargsyan statement. When asked by 
a visiting Diasporan youth what kind of future 
awaits Armenia, “one that is reminiscent of the 
Treaty of Batumi, or a future that returns Western 
Armenia, with Mt. Ararat as well,” the Armenian 
President responded “That depends on you and 
your generation. Our generation was victorious in 
Karabakh.”
The reaction from Ankara was harsh. In Baku, 
a visiting Erdogan lectured President Sargsyan, 
qualifying his remarks as provocative and not 
appropriate for the leader of a country. He said 
the president was “planting seeds of hatred and 
enmity” in future generations and should therefore 
“apologize.” Other high-level Turkish officials joined 
the criticism, with the Deputy Prime Minister 
going so far as to sound a threat:  “No one can look 
askance at our mountains, fields and waters. We 
are the owners of these lands. Armenia has serious 
economic problems. When they were starved, we 
sent them wheat. They should think straight and 
not pull the Diasora into the game.”
Armenia’s President ignored the incident. But 
during an official visit to Cyprus and Greece, the 
President lashed back, condemning the policies of 
Erdogan’s Turkey, calling them neo-Ottoman. In a 
subsequent interview, he said that Turkey, despite its 
size, does not have the right to lecture others. 
He went further and said Armenia can retract its 
signatures on the 2009 Armenia-Turkey protocols. 
Nevertheless, he did not do so, probably not to elicit 
adverse international reaction. Instead, high-level 
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Armenian officials tried to stay on one message – 
that Turkey was responsible for the unsuccessful 
rapprochement process. 
Given that there is no change in the Karabakh 
process, it is unlikely that Turkey will validate  the 
protocols which it re-introduced to the agenda 
after the convening of the newly elected Parliament. 
Turkey has publicly claimed a position from 
which it cannot move. Nor does it appear to have 
any desire to do so. Whatever degree of pressure 
Americans and Europeans used to apply until 2008 
and the introduction of the protocols, in order 
to convince Turkey to remove the blockade of 
Armenia, that pressure is no longer there. Turkey 
succeeded in creating a linkage – a situation in 
which international public opinion accepts that 
the major obstacle to overcoming the adversarial 
Ankara-Yerevan relationship is the unresolved 
Karabakh conflict.
There are several reasons for the absence of domestic 
and international pressure on Turkey to normalize 
relations.
•	 Joining the European Union is no longer 
an urgent priority for Turkey. Therefore, 
requiring Turkey to recognize the 
Armenian Genocide or lift the blockade 
on Armenia are no longer useful levers.  
•	 The Genocide recognition process has in 
fact halted, thus Turkey is not compelled 
to create the impression of dialogue with 
Armenia.
•	 Turkey’s fundamental purpose in closing 
the border was to economically bring 
Armenia to its knees. So long as that 
objective remains on Turkey’s agenda, 
Armenia should not have serious 
expectations of an open border. 
•	 The closed Armenian border is no 
longer perceived to adversely affect 
Eastern Turkey’s economy. During the 
last eight years, Turkey has registered 
unprecedented economic growth, has 
become the world’s 17th largest economy 
and is capable of investing in its eastern 
regions, at the Armenian border. 
For Turkey, Azerbaijan remains an important 
country and partner. Given ethnic and political 
alliances between Azerbaijan and Turkey on the 
one hand, and tortured historical memories with 
Armenia on the other, Ankara will not shake the 
Turkey-Azerbaijan relationship.
In May, during the Parliamentary 
election campaign period, Erdogan 
visited another Turkish city near 
the Armenian border. In Igdir, he 
declared that Ankara would not 
improve relations with Armenia 
so long as the Karabakh conflict 
remains unresolved
Even as Turkey’s Armenia policies have become 
more inflexible and harsh, Turkey appears to 
be trying to compensate for that by adopting 
more tolerant approaches to the problems of the 
Armenians of Turkey.  
 
Armenians who had temporarily relocated to 
Turkey from Armenia were allowed to send 
their children to Armenian schools in Istanbul – 
something that was not allowed in the past, but 
was suddenly possible for the 2011-12 school year, 
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without any official paperwork. This somewhat 
ameliorated the situation of the migrant Armenians 
living in Istanbul, who have no official immigrant 
status and therefore no legal access to educational 
institutions. The community’s response had been to 
establish secret schools, operating out of cellars. 
 
Turkey is also allowing the renovation and re-
opening of Armenian architectural and historical 
structures on its territory as a way of demonstrating 
goodwill, despite official relations being frozen.
The statements coming from 
Yerevan, and especially from 
Ankara, left the impression that 
no one regretted the demise of  the 
Armenia-Turkey protocols
Thus, in August, the Turkish government signed 
a decree regarding the return of the community 
properties seized by the state in 1936 from minority 
communities. In September, the Holy Cross 
Church on the island of Akhtamar in Lake Van held 
religious services for the second time. In October, 
Diarbakir’s St. Karapet Church was re-opened. It 
is the largest Armenian Church in the Near and 
Middle East. Its renovation was sponsored by 
individual Armenian donors together with the 
Diyarbakir Municipality. 
 
In response to the strong earthquake which caused 
great damage in the City of Van, in Eastern Turkey, 
in October, the Armenian government offered to 
send a disaster relief team, but Turkey announced 
that they would handle the consequences of the 
disaster on their own. Nevertheless, Armenia’s 
Emergency Situations Ministry sent tents, sleeping 
bags, blankets and other essentials to Van. President 
Sargsyan, on a visit to Moscow, joined the Russian 
President to speak to the Turkish president to 
express concern. 
 
Ironically, Turkish journalists in Armenia during 
the weeks of the earthquake and immediately after, 
realized for the first time the proximity of the two 
countries and the impact of closed borders. The 
city of Van is 200 km (or 130 miles) from Yerevan, 
and was the center of major media and emergency 
operations. Yet, travel from Armenia was prohibitive 
and immediate participation was not possible. 
 
This year, too, no new countries were added to 
the list of those who have already recognized 
the Armenian Genocide. The process had come 
to a halt with the introduction of the protocols, 
whereby Turkey gained the right to say that they 
themselves are dealing with this bilateral issue as 
well and international intervention is unnecessary. 
Although Turkey has not followed through with 
the protocols’ commitment to bilaterally addressing 
the genocide issue, the international community 
has not re-engaged on genocide recognition. 
Turkey continues to strike back at any international 
efforts towards recognition. In September, French 
President Nicolas Sarcozy visited Armenia and 
announced that in the face of continuing denialism 
by Turkey, France may consider making state denial 
a crime in France. The Turkish Prime Minister’s 
quick response was that Sarkozy should worry about 
the generations to come, not the elections to come. 
 
NAGORNO KARABAKH CONFLICT
For the Karabakh conflict resolution process, the 
year ended pretty much as it began. The mediators – 
the three Minsk Group co-Chairs, representing the 
US, France and Russia, visited at the beginning of 
the year, with hope, and at the end, with frustration 
over what had already become a political stalemate. 
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At the same time, the situation escalated on the 
front line. Without hope in negotiations, snipers 
(mostly from the Azerbaijani side) had become 
active and successful. The number of deaths and 
casualties on the line of contact escalated.
Throughout the year, the sides not only blamed each 
other for the failed negotiations, but also continued 
to disagree over which is the legitimate negotiating 
document – the Madrid document or its modified 
version.
The most important event of the year was the 
meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani  
presidents, in Kazan, Russia, under the auspices of 
the Russian president. Oddly, in the run-up to the 
Kazan meeting, when the Haykakan Zhamanak 
daily newspaper published the six points in 
the Madrid document presented to the OSCE 
depository in December 2007, there was almost no 
public debate on the contents.
There were meetings of the presidents prior to 
Kazan, as well. They had met in March, in Sochi, 
Russia, again under the auspices of the Russian 
president.
In May, during the G8 summit in Deauville, France, 
the presidents of the co-chair countries issued a 
joint statement calling on the presidents of Armenia 
and Azerbaijan to use the Kazan meeting to 
conclude the basic principles of the resolution of the 
Karabakh conflict. They also called on Sargsyan and 
Aliyev to prepare their publics not for a new war, 
but for peace. This was the fourth joint statement by 
the leaders of co-chair countries, made over a decade 
and a half. 
The June 24 meeting of the presidents in Kazan 
evoked a great deal of optimism, especially in 
international circles. The President of the US 
personally called both Sargsyan and Aliyev on the 
eve of the talks. President Sarkozy sent a message.
Following the failure at Kazan, the US and France 
publicly expressed disappointment. President 
Medvedev did the same, but he also dispatched his 
foreign minister to Baku and Yerevan to make one 
last ditch effort. Everyone kept silent about the new 
proposals presented by Minister Lavrov; neither 
their contents nor the response of the sides to the 
Kremlin were made public.
In 2011, there were three fundamental factors 
which brought the process to a deadend.
Azerbaijan ignored the international 
community’s, specifically the 
OSCE’s, calls to remove snipers 
from the front lines
First, Azerbaijan consistently attempted to 
underscore the principle of territorial integrity, 
exclusively. From the president on down, high-
level officials undermined the referendum concept 
which was codified in the document and served as 
the fundamental and binding element that makes 
possible the conciliation of the two seemingly 
contradictory principles of territorial integrity 
and self-determination. Without a referendum 
as a mutually-acceptable instrument, the entire 
document can and perhaps has collapsed. 
Second, the Kazan meeting failed despite the 
international community’s unprecedented high 
expectations and the cautious expectations of the 
conflicting sides. The problem was not the failure 
of the meeting itself, but that the Armenian side 
accepted the document as a basis for negotiations 
while the Azerbaijani side still had 10 additional 
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demands. This pointed to a deep dis-balance in the 
negotiations.
Throughout the year, the sides not 
only blamed each other for the failed 
negotiations, but also continued to 
disagree over which is the legitimate 
negotiating document – the Madrid 
document or its modified version
Third, 2011 was notable for the exceptionally high 
tone of military rhetoric, an equally unprecedented 
number of ceasefire violations and the number of 
deaths on the line of contact. As the negotiations 
appeared more and more hopeless, shooting 
incidents increased. There were dozens of casualties. 
When in October and November, Azerbaijani 
snipers killed Armenian recruits, Armenia’s defense 
ministry announced that sniper activity would 
receive a “full response” using “disproportionate 
force” and the other side would be punished “several 
times over with greater losses.”
Azerbaijan ignored the international community’s, 
specifically the OSCE’s, calls to remove snipers 
from the front lines. Nevertheless, Yerevan and 
Stepanakert responded favorably saying they would 
withdraw their front line shooters if Azerbaijan did 
the same. 
In September, Karabakh’s anti-air defense forces 
shot down an unmanned Azerbaijani missile.
Armenia’s president invited the attention of the 
international community to Azerbaijan’s militaristic  
rhetoric stressing that Azerbaijan is looking for 
an opportune moment to recommence military 
activities.
First Azerbaijan, then Karabakh and Armenia each 
organized military parades, with the purpose of 
demonstrating military might before the adversary.  
In October, there was a short meeting in Brussels of 
the defense ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan.
In the context of increased warmongering, the 
possible re-opening of the Stepanakert airport in 
Karabakh did elicit significant threats from the 
Azerbaijani side, promising to down any Armenian 
planes. Although Armenia’s president vowed to be 
the first passenger, there have been no flights yet, for 
reasons which range from technical explanations to 
possible political or diplomatic obstacles.
Anti-Armenian propaganda could even be seen 
in athletic meets. In the fall, the World Boxing 
Championships in Baku became the scene of an 
attack on Armenian boxers in the ring, something 
the authorities quietly tolerated.
The Turkish foreign minister, too, joined in 
and used his UN General Assembly podium in 
September portunity to aggressively and openly 
link Armenia-Turkey normalization to Armenian 
concessions on the Karabakh conflict.
The CIS Inter-religious Council held its meeting 
in Yerevan in November, in the context of these 
frontline incidents. Sheikh ul Islam Allahshukur 
Pashazade, head of the Committee of Caucasus 
Moslems, attended and was received by the 
Armenian president as well. The Patriarch of 
All Russians, Kiril I, joined the Armenian and 
Azerbaijani religious leaders in a joint statement 
again calling for the removal of snipers from the line 
of contact.
In December, the annual OSCE Ministerial 
Council took place in Vilnius. During the meeting, 
the high-level diplomats of the Minsk Group co-
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chair countries and the Armenian and Azerbaijani 
foreign ministers adopted a joint declaration 
confirming that the Karabakh conflict cannot have a 
military solution.
In October, Azerbaijan became a UN Security 
Council non-permanent member for 2012 and 
2013, from the East European group, competing 
against Hungary and Slovenia. The victory was 
interpreted differently in Yerevan and Baku. The 
Azerbaijani authorities hailed this as a major 
diplomatic victory, while in Yerevan, the authorities 
undermined and dismissed its significance. 
Years earlier, Armenia, too, had placed its own 
candidacy for Security Council membership 
for 2012-2013. In July 2011 however, Armenia 
withdrew, assuming perhaps that those countries 
that would have voted for Armenia, might vote for 
Slovenia. In fact, however, Armenia’s withdrawal 
helped Azerbaijan’s candidacy because those 
countries which might have abstained from 
supporting either Armenia or Azerbaijan because 
of the conflict between the two, now were free to 
support Azerbaijan. 
On the other hand, the history of UN votes 
even on nonbinding resolutions which have over 
the years been introduced to the UN agenda by 
Azerbaijan garnered not more than three dozen 
votes, fundamentally because Armenia resisted and 
countered the effort.
BEYOND THE REGION
While Russia remained most active as mediator in 
the Karabakh resolution process, it also expanded 
weapons transfers, not just to its ally Armenia, but 
to Azerbaijan as well. Military parades in Baku 
in June and in Yerevan in September served as 
opportunities for the two sides to show off their 
latest acquisitions. 
Azerbaijan displayed Russian-made S-300 theater 
air defense systems. There were credible reports that 
Azerbaijan is awaiting delivery on two dozen Mi-35 
attack helicopters from Russia. These in addition 
to earlier Azerbaijani acquisitions which had come 
from Ukraine, Israel, Belarus and Turkey
For its part, Armenia for the first time confirmed 
that its arsenal held surface-to-surface ballistic 
missile systems, including short-range Tochka and 
medium-range Scud-B, which S-300s are aimed 
to combat. There were also reports that Armenia 
would soon receive more advanced S-400 air-
defense systems from Russia.
The arms build-up is continuing to raise the stakes 
in a potential military confrontation between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, with the two sides facing a 
sort of MAD doctrine, where ‘D’ – for now at least 
– stands for ‘devastation’ rather than ‘destruction.’
But for this strategy to continue to have a deterrent 
effect, Armenia is forced to rely on the benevolence 
of foreign powers – most significantly Russia – 
to be able to counter Azerbaijan’s energy-fueled 
acquisitions. As a member of the Collective Secutiry 
Treaty Organization, Armenia is able to buy arms at 
concessionary prices.
Reflecting this dependence, there was no official 
Armenian criticism of Russian arms supplies to 
Azerbaijan or Russia’s support for Azerbaijan’s 
ultimately successful bid for a UN Security Council 
seat also sought by NATO members Slovenia and 
Hungary.
Towards the end of February, after President 
Sargsyan’s visit to Moscow, it was announced that 
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gas prices would remain the same for Armenian 
consumers during 2011. It was not clear whether 
Armenia had negotiated a lower price for the 
Russian gas, given the fact that Armenian 
consumers pay twice the purchase price from Russia. 
In October, the Armenian president was in Moscow 
for a state visit. In 2011, as in the previous year, 
bilateral trade was expected to reach $1 billion.
But an all-important goal of building a new nuclear 
power plant appeared stalled with Russia – already 
selected as main contractor – offering only one-fifth 
of the required $5 billion financing. By year’s end, 
given the deferred new construction, Armenia’s 
president acknowledged there may be a need to 
extend the life of the current plant. 
For over a decade, shut down of the existing 
nuclear reactor has been a European Union 
priority with regard to Armenia, which refuses to 
close the reactor in the absence of equally reliable 
replacement capacity.
Shortly after assuming the EU presidency in the 
second half of 2011, the Polish president toured 
the region in July and Poland hosted the Eastern 
Partnership summit in September where familiar 
promises were heard about further economic 
integration, visa facilitation and the expected 
association agreement. During the year, the High 
Representative of the European Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton 
also visited the region as did the President of the 
European Parliament.
Bilaterally, 2011 saw a number of high-profile 
exchanges between Armenia and France, probably 
reflecting the role of the French Armenian voting 
bloc rather than Armenia’s place in French foreign 
policy. 
Sargsyan was in Paris in September, and shortly 
after, Nicolas Sarkozy arrived in Yerevan for a 
two-day state visit that contrasted with brief stops 
in Baku and Tbilisi that followed. As part of the 
domestic political contest, the Mayor of Paris, a 
leading member of the party opposing Sarkozy’s 
re-election, appeared in Yerevan, not long after 
Sarkozy.
In March, the Nagorno Karabakh President visited 
the French National Assembly and in August, a 
French parliamentary delegation consisting of 
senior ruling party members made pro-Armenian 
pronouncements while on a visit to Karabakh.
Also in 2011, Armenia stepped up military 
cooperation with Poland and Germany. In the first 
instance, plans were announced for joint military 
production facilities and in the second the emphasis 
was on international peacekeeping training as well 
as German assistance for introducing rule-of-law 
measures within the Armenian military.
Armenia’s expanded 126-person troop continued to 
serve as part of a larger German unit with NATO 
forces in Afghanistan. (Prior to 2008, the Armenian 
contingent in Iraq deployed with a Polish-led multi-
national division). An Armenian unit also remained 
in Kosovo as part of a Greek battalion. 
Unlike Russia and probably following the US lead, 
Germany and other European Union countries 
have so far refused to permit major military sales 
to either Azerbaijan or Armenia. This helped delay 
the sale to Azerbaijan of Turkish self-propelled 
howitzers that use German-American engines.
The United States also continued its de-facto 
restrictions on military cooperation with Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, with engagement largely limited to 
education and peacekeeping operations training. 
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Although the US expressed interest in boosting 
Azerbaijan’s maritime defenses to counter Iran, 
it has refused Baku’s repeated requests for arms 
sales since 2006. At the same time, the American 
ExImBank agreed to guarantee financing for 
Azerbaijan’s purchase of US satellite technology 
that could have dual-use implications. 
In July, US and Armenia resumed the Bilateral 
Security Dialogue that was suspended years earlier 
and the annual US-Armenia Task Force that 
focuses on US assistance and economic ties met in 
September. 
The five-year Millennium Challenge assistance 
program concluded mid-year with no immediate 
prospects for extension. The program was curtailed 
from the original $235 to $175 million because 
Armenia did not meet the rule of law and good 
governance criteria.
In August, using across-the-board budget cuts as 
explanation, congressional appropriators did not 
include a specific allocation for US aid to Karabakh, 
leaving the 12-year-old program to the State 
Department’s discretion. A specific aid allocation 
was also dropped for Azerbaijan and several other 
countries. Armenia assistance programs were expected 
to remain at the level of about $40 million a year. 
US-Armenia trade stood at about $190 million 
in 2010 and about $125 million for the first eight 
months of 2011.
There were only limited high-level contacts between 
the US and Armenia in 2011.  In September, 
President Sargsyan’s visits to New York and Los 
Angeles focused on Armenian community events 
marking the 20th anniversary of independence and 
no meetings with senior administration officials 
were reported.
The American Secretary of State met with 
the Armenian president during the Munich 
Security Conference early in the year, and with 
the Armenian foreign minister in May. Deputy 
Secretary James Steinberg and his successor Bill 
Burns were the highest-ranking US officials to visit 
Armenia (and its Caucasus neighbors), respectively 
in February and October. Those visits largely 
focused on regional security, Armenia’s domestic 
politics and ways to expand economic ties.
OUTLOOK
 
2012 will see presidential elections in Russia, France 
and the US, the results of which can change the 
internal priorities in each country and their relations 
with each other. These three countries, besides being 
global power centers, are also the Karabakh conflict 
Minsk Group mediators and thus the nature and 
direction of their continuing engagement may 
see changes. Of the three, Russia will regardless 
remain more directly engaged, given its geographic 
proximity and influence. 
Little can be expected in terms of improved 
Russia-Georgia relations. Swiss-mediated dialogue 
led to Georgia’s removing its veto of Russian 
membership in the World Trade Organization. But 
further deepening is unlikely given Prime Minister 
Putin’s probable return to the presidency and the 
continuing Putin-Saakashvili mutual acrimony.
Georgia’s NATO membership is not expected to 
pick up speed, due both to the European hesitance 
to further antagonize Russia, and Georgia’s own 
unreadiness. 
There are no grounds for optimism in either Turkey-
Armenia relations or the Karabakh settlement 
process. Ankara continues to insist on progress on 
the Karabakh matter before moving forward with 
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Armenia relations. And the Karabakh process is 
stalled because the sides are in disagreement over 
what document is on the table.  
Tensions will remain high on the line of contact 
between Karabakh and Azerbaijan, with active 
sniper activity. Azerbaijan will continue to ignore 
the OSCE’s calls to pull back the frontline shooters. 
Nevertheless, planned full out war is unlikely. 
Azerbaijan’s UN Security Council membership will 
also serve to restrain Azerbaijan militarily, even as it 
achieves greater diplomatic influence.
The Arab Spring moved from Northern Africa 
to the Middle East. Syria and Iran fell under 
international scrutiny and the pressure on them will 
increase in 2012. Iran’s parliamentary elections will 
also invite additional attention on Iran. 
 
POLICY OPTIONS
Armenia’s regional policy lacks an ideological 
anchor. The government offers no interpretation 
about its actions vis-à-vis neighbors or allies. As a 
result, it is left up to others to interpret Armenia’s 
policies. That interpretation is rarely in Armenia’s 
favor. The poor state of US-Armenia and Russia-
Armenia relations is a consequence of such inaction. 
Armenia must retake the initiative to articulate its 
own national policy.  
Armenia must augment its efforts in the 
international arena to balance the opportunities 
Azerbaijan has gained by its UN Security Council 
membership. Indeed, Armenia should use 
Azerbaijan’s presence on that Council to pressure 
it to tame the military rhetoric, the line of contact 
aggression, and instead positively engage in the 
talks.  
The Karabakh negotiating document is in an 
uncertain state. Even as Azerbaijan continues to 
try to dilute the document’s targeted approach, 
Armenia must clarify which document is actually 
on the table and once and for all highlight 
and formalize the use of a referendum as a 
non-threatening instrument to codify the self-
determination principle.
The stagnant Armenia-Turkey situation works 
to Turkey’s benefit. Turkey’s representatives use 
frequent high-level meetings to reinforce their 
position. In the first months of 2012, Armenia must 
initiate some action in order to force Turkey back to 
the process, perhaps by taking action regarding the 
protocols, even if that means recalling them from 
Armenia’s National Assembly.
The EU Association Agreement discussions present 
a fine opportunity to publicly redefine and reaffirm 
Armenia’s policy regarding Europe. The call for 
deeper European integration ought to be heard 
regularly. If packaged correctly, this does not need 
to alienate Russia, or contradict Armenian-Russian 
relations. Armenia’s European aspirations should 
be heard in calibrated and articulated statements, 
demonstrating passion and commitment to 
European processes, beyond facilitated visas. For 
that commitment to be credible, beyond talking 
Europe, Armenia’s leaders must take political steps 
that are in line with European standards, beginning 
with good elections.
Armenia lags behind Georgia in European 
integration. Even that undesirable situation should 
be used to advantage to deepen relations with 
Georgia, by developing common programs that 
aim not just for good neighborly relations, but 
integration. 
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The political situation in Arme-
nia remained tense but calm in 
2011 as President Serzh Sargsyan 
further consolidated his power 
in the run-up to the parliamen-
tary elections of  2012 which will 
have a determining effect on the 
presidential poll in 2013. Sargsyan 
handily warded off  continuing 
challenges to his rule from the Ar-
menian National Congress, led by 
Armenia’s first president, Levon 
Ter-Petrossian. The other major 
opposition parties, the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation - Dash-
naktsutyun and the Heritage Party, 
posed even less of  a threat to the 
ruling regime. They both acknowl-
edged that both the president and 
the national assembly will com-
plete their constitutional terms of  
office.
Despite repeated threats to stage the kind of 
popular revolt that brought down ruling regimes 
in Egypt and Tunisia, the Armenian National 
Congress (ANC) and its leader avoided a renewed 
confrontation with the government, confining 
themselves to regular demonstrations in Yerevan’s 
Freedom Square. Ter-Petrossian proved to be ready 
to compromise with the government. And the 
president, too, made concessions and promises.
This give-and-take took the form of a dialogue 
between representatives of the ruling Republican 
Party and the ANC. The President appears to 
have been the main beneficiary of this brief and 
incomplete gesture. He clearly scored points in the 
West, while avoiding further concessions that, at 
home, could have been seen as a sign of weakness.
As much as it was hailed as a landmark development 
by Western governments and the Council of 
Europe, the dialogue was never expected to address 
the root cause of political tensions in the country: 
a lack of elections widely recognized as free and 
fair, and consequently a continuing distrust of the 
most recent nation-wide elections, held in 2008. 
Government promises, made in the course of the 
year, to hold more democratic elections, met with 
skepticism from the opposition and many civil 
society representatives. Hence, there are lingering 
fears in society that the next national elections due 
in 2012 and 2013 might see a repeat of the 2008 
political crisis.
These fears are legitimized in the context of various 
studies on social cohesion, reciprocal trust (or 
distrust) between the governed and their rulers, and 
the population’s hopes and fears.
The year began with signs of growing friction within 
Armenia’s governing coalition. The coalition, which 
had been formed immediately following the 2008 
election, continued to be led rather unilaterally by 
the president’s Republican Party. The second most 
important coalition party, Prosperous Armenia, 
increasingly strived to stake a greater role as an 
independent political force. What had begun in 
2010, as an attempt by Prosperous Armenia to 
work more independently continued in 2011. 
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Representatives repeatedly stated that the party 
led by National Assembly member and one of the 
country’s biggest businessmen, Gagik Tsarukian, 
while remaining in the coalition, would seek to 
come out on top in the 2012 National Assembly 
election. Thus, Prosperous Armenia was for months 
reluctant to endorse Sargsyan’s reelection bid 
despite mounting pressure from the Republican 
Party and from President Sargsyan himself. In 
February, Tsarukian caved in and together with the 
leaderships of the Republican Party and the third 
coalition party, Rule of Law (Orinats Yerkir) said 
they will jointly strive to help Sargsyan win a second 
five-year term in 2013.  Moreover, they also pledged 
to refrain from competing against each other or 
“changing the proportion of seats held by the forces 
within the coalition” in the May 2012 National 
Assembly elections. 
The year began with signs of  
growing friction within Armenia’s 
governing coalition
This, of course, came to directly contradict 
Prosperous Armenia’s earlier stated ambition to gain 
the largest number of seats, even at the Republican 
Party’s expense. But by year’s end, the party and its 
leader insisted again that they were determined to 
go it alone and to challenge the Republican Party 
in the elections. The resulting demonstrations of 
pressure on Tsarukian and his supporters extended 
from administrative coercion, including from the 
Tax Service, to efforts by law enforcement agencies 
to detain those close to the politically ambitious 
businessman. As a result, the public began to see the 
potential of Tsarukian’s party not as opposition, but 
at least as alternative to the status quo.
In February, the ANC launched a new campaign 
of anti-government demonstrations. The bloc was 
clearly buoyed by the success of popular uprisings 
in Tunisia and Egypt, as were many of its supporters 
who attended its spring rallies in 2011 by the 
thousands. Ter-Petrossian initially threatened 
the government to call early presidential and 
parliamentary elections or face the kind of unrest 
that rocked the Arab states. Speaking at the next 
rally held on the March 1 anniversary of the 2008 
post-election violence in Yerevan, he issued a list of 
15 political and socioeconomic demands which he 
said Sargsyan must fulfill before the ANC would be 
prepared to enter a dialogue. 
But Ter-Petrossian subsequently softened his 
rhetoric, saying that his political force is ready to 
start negotiations with the authorities if they free all 
political prisoners, promised an objective inquiry 
into the March 2008 events and guaranteed the 
opposition access to Yerevan’s Freedom Square.
Sargsyan essentially accepted all three 
preconditions. Later in March, the ANC met with 
virtually no resistance from riot police as it led, for 
the first time in three years, thousands of supporters 
into the square, albeit, as in the past, without 
permission from the municipality. 
In late April, the president ordered a renewed and 
objective inquiry into the 2008 unrest in Yerevan 
and ensured the lifting of a de facto government ban 
on opposition demonstrations in Freedom Square.  
Sargsyan went on to initiate a general amnesty that 
led to the release of some 1000 persons convicted of 
various crimes. Four ANC loyalists, including Nikol 
Pashinian, editor of the opposition daily newspaper 
Haykakan Zhamanak, and Sasun Mikaelian, a 
former deputy of the National Assembly, who were 
still in prison on charges that were disputed, were 
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also set free in late May, the day after the National 
Assembly passed an amnesty bill. The amnesty was 
in effect through Independence Day September 21.
Addressing another Freedom Square rally at the 
end of May, Ter-Petrossian hailed the government 
concessions as his “biggest victory” since 2008 and 
spoke of the emergence of a “new political situation” 
that allows the government and the opposition 
to achieve “reciprocal understanding” through 
dialogue.
From the beginning, the expectations were that 
such a dialogue could, at most, improve the 
internal political environment in Armenia, improve 
Armenia’s international standing and shed more 
light on the factors behind post-election instability 
in Armenia. The dialogue could not eliminate the 
causes, but could perhaps ameliorate the political 
consequences of the Great Divide that had ensued 
since 2008. 
Rival opposition groups as well as some 
commentators asserted, however, that Ter-
Petrossian has simply struck a deal with Sargsyan 
that would enable the president to at least complete 
his five-year term in office in 2013. They said the 
ANC leader is also seeking government assurances 
that the ANC will have a solid presence in 
Armenia’s next National Assembly. Ter-Petrossian 
dismissed this speculation, insisting that the ANC 
will press for fresh elections during upcoming 
negotiations with the ruling coalition.
Negotiating teams formed by the three-party 
coalition and the ANC held five rounds of 
negotiations essentially focusing on ANC demands 
for special elections. Discussion was cut short 
when the ANC suspended the dialogue in protest 
against the August arrest and prosecution of a 
young ANC activist, who was detained along with 
six other members of the ANC’s youth wing after 
an altercation with riot police in Yerevan under 
circumstances that remain disputed. Unlike the 
other activists, even at year’s end, he remained under 
arrest charged with assault. 
Ter-Petrossian again made clear in September that 
he is against the idea of a “revolution or uprising” 
and appeared to retreat from the pre-term election 
demand as part of a “reasonable compromise” with 
the Sargsyan administration.
The ANC met with virtually no 
resistance from riot police as it led, 
for the first time in three years, 
thousands of  supporters into the 
square
Thus, after a year of consistently moving the bar  and 
elevating demands, Ter-Petrossian dropped the key 
‘special election’ condition and with it, the dialogue. 
In a later rally, he also extended a tentative invitation 
to cooperate with the Prosperous Armenia Party, 
extolling their decision to challenge the ruling 
Republican Party as a positive contribution to a fair 
electoral process. 
Sargsyan, for his part, earned plaudits in Europe. 
The European Union and the Council of 
Europe welcomed the already-stalled dialogue. 
In a resolution adopted in early October, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(PACE) commended the president’s overtures, 
stating, “The chapter on the March 2008 events 
can finally be considered closed.” The ANC and the 
Heritage Party criticized this conclusion, accusing 
PACE of pro-government bias. 
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But the PACE resolution also stressed that 
“genuinely democratic parliamentary elections” are 
essential for avoiding a repeat of the March 2008 
events. Sargsyan pledged to do his best to ensure the 
proper conduct of the 2012 elections. He pointed 
to the passage in May of fresh amendments to 
Armenia’s Electoral Code that were largely endorsed 
by Council of Europe experts.
The opposition insists that the 
authorities still lack the political will 
to hold free and fair elections so long 
as they run the risk of  losing power
All three leading opposition forces – the ANC, 
the ARF and Heritage – downplayed the promises 
and the significance of the Electoral Code changes. 
A key opposition argument is that Armenia’s new 
Central Election Commission and precinct-level 
commissions are heavily dominated by government 
loyalists. But most curious is the coalition deal, 
they say, signed in February, that signals an a 
priori agreement among coalition members on the 
number of seats to be gained and shared among 
them. They control at least 100 seats in the current 
131-member National Assembly and thus the 
opposition claims that Sargsyan and his political 
allies have effectively predetermined the outcome 
of the 2012 elections, thus raising serious questions 
about the government’s democratic credentials. The 
opposition insists that the authorities still lack the 
political will to hold free and fair elections so long 
as they run the risk of losing power.
The other two opposition parties both are 
represented in the National Assembly. The ARF 
with 16 seats, launched in February a nationwide 
campaign called “A Vote is Power” and aimed at 
raising public awareness of electoral rights. The 
party claimed to have signed thousands of symbolic 
“contracts” with voters across the country, obliging 
them, to participate in the next elections and not 
to sell their votes. The ARF also rallied several 
hundred supporters in Gyumri in early September 
in what its leaders described as the start of 
nationwide demonstrations aimed at drumming up 
popular support for “regime change.” But this was 
done without attacking the president or demanding 
his resignation.
Thus, the ARF’s place in political circles 
remained somewhat confusing, given their 
careful pronouncements, and their continuing 
chairmanship of National Assembly commissions, 
even after the Party left the coalition in 2009. 
The third opposition party, packing the most punch 
for their size, with a mere seven seats in the Natonal 
Assembly, the Heritage Party is the one whose 
members most often raise popular issues within 
the National Assembly, including  environmental 
alarms, speaking against domestic violence and 
violence in the army. 
Raffi Hovannisian, the party’s founder, in March, 
carried out a two-week long hunger strike. He did 
so “for justice,” he said, as he sat in Freedom Square, 
prior to and following the government decision 
to re-allow rallies to be held there. Thousands of 
individuals came out of curiosity or to express 
solidarity, including representatives of political 
parties, but not Levon Ter-Petrossian.
Later in the year, Hovannisian addressed a 
very specific and lengthy open letter to the 
president, identifying the steps necessary to hold 
representative and fair elections. This time, he 
was snubbed by the president, who dismissed the 
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proposals, explaining that the process to free and 
fair elections is under control and assured.
Thus, whether borne of political or personal 
reasons, various opportunities for the three non-
coalition parties to join forces were missed during 
an otherwise unremarkable political year. Given 
each party’s strong ideological underpinnings, 
none of them seriously threaten each other’s 
base. Nevertheless, there were no demonstrable 
efforts to seeking a path to cooperation and cease 
undercutting each other.
They even ignored the opportunity presented by 
local elections. Over the course of the year, elections 
took place every week in various towns and villages, 
electing either mayors or members of city councils. 
In a most important election in the border city of 
Ijevan, in Tavush marz, the Prosperous Armenia 
candidate beat out the candidate of the ruling 
Republican Party, thus making plain the real 
opportunity for competition that 2012 may present. 
No other parties or coalitions have registered 
victories.
It was probably this election that drove Ter-
Petrossian and other political actors and observers 
to begin to view the possible re-drawing of forces, 
with Prosperous Armenia as a separate actor, as 
a real possibility. The Prosperous Armenia Party 
began to slowly perceive itself, and the public 
perceived it as, if not opposition, at least alternative 
to the status quo. If it succeeds, it will be more 
about the phenomenon of Tsarukian as alternative, 
not the person. 
The final piece in this newly-forming domestic 
political puzzle is the possible role that former 
president Robert Kocharian may play. 
Earlier in the year, Kocharian denounced the 
coalition’s unfolding dialogue with the ANC, 
saying that the dialogue could result in a dangerous 
“collusion behind the voters’ backs” over the 
“parameters of an imitation at a political struggle” 
by the two rival camps. 
Those statements by Kocharian were the clearest 
indication yet of his disagreements with Sargsyan. 
The ex-president exposed his discontent with the 
current Armenian leadership in February when 
he backed Tsarukian in his initial dispute with 
the ruling Republican Party. Kocharian himself 
was a factor in that dispute, when the Prosperous 
Armenia Party leader claimed that Kocharian 
could easily have taken over Sargsyan’s Republican 
Party during his 1998-2008 presidency but did 
not do so because he never regarded political 
parties as “anybody’s property,” hinting at a possible 
Kocharian return to politics. Kocharian made no 
statements confirming or denying that possibility. 
The continuing questions about Kocharian’s 
possible return will influence the ways in which the 
Prosperous Armenia and Republican Party conflict 
develops. It will certainly impact the possibility 
of Prosperous Armenia’s cooperation with other 
political forces. 
The final piece in this newly-forming 
domestic political puzzle is the 
possible role that former president 
Robert Kocharian may play
Indeed, these changing configurations and the 
inherent political dangers were both the cause 
and the consequence of several major end-of-year 
resignations within the government, including 
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that of President Sargsyan’s Chief of Staff, and the 
President of the National Assembly. 
In the midst of these political developments, 
Armenia’s National Assembly passed a series of 
important legislative packages this year.
None of this legislation came as the result of direct 
civic pressure, although the year did see further 
growth in civic activism, increasingly carried out 
through Facebook and other online social media. 
The public groups and movements 
were composed of  activists concerned 
with a variety of  sectors and united 
in their opposition to various 
government positions
Non-governmental organization (NGO) leaders 
insist that although there have been no significant 
obstacles to NGO operations and activities, 
nevertheless, the lack of significant growth in public 
engagement in legislative and social environments is 
tantamount to a fallback. 
2011 saw improvement in NGO registration 
efforts by making them simple on-line procedures. 
The Justice Ministry’s 2010 effort to create some 
government oversight of NGO operations ended 
when the Ministry shut down its own agency 
charged with that responsibility.  State harassment 
was limited or non-existent in most cases, but that 
was coupled with little state interest, cooperation 
and facilitation of NGO activism, visibility or 
access. 
Within civil society, narrowly defined groups 
emerged and became visibly and vocally active to 
address specific issues. They generally presented 
their concerns to government through public 
actions, being skeptical about the receptivity or 
willingness of executive or legislative branch officials 
to listen or act without public scrutiny. Civil society 
activists were either afraid to engage in dialogue 
with the government, felt inadequate to offer their 
views or simply did not believe the government 
would listen to their recommendations. In other 
words, as policy issues became more complex and 
challenges by policy makers more sophisticated, 
activists and their supporters came up short in 
capacity to respond to and effectively engage with 
decision makers on a substantive level. The result 
was that civil society activists managed to influence 
specific events or decisions but did not play a role in 
public policy. 
 
Universities and think tanks did not step in to offer 
alternative policy analysis. In addition, aside from 
isolated and targeted polling, or donor-supported 
research, little or no quantitative data are available 
for the formulation of public policy.  On the 
other hand, selective and targeted efforts by some 
NGOs, organized with the purpose of offering 
policy recommendations to legislators, through the 
National Assembly’s permanent commissions, were 
successfully received. The reason for the success 
can be found in the nature of the type of legislation 
proposed – not targeting specific economic or 
political interests, but focusing on general policy 
decisions.  
The public groups and movements were composed 
of activists concerned with a variety of sectors and 
united in their opposition to various government 
positions. Yet, there was no visible formation of 
coalitions or permanent structures. 
In addition, as new, young activists move into 
the civic activism sector, it is clear that there is 
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a need for new skills necessary if expressions of 
public discontent are to be transformed into policy 
recommendations.  
The media did not offer civil society organizations 
and actors broad coverage because they are not seen 
to have a following of a scale that would create the 
necessary audience. Additionally, media outlets 
remained driven less by public interest and more 
by their corporate agendas. At the same time, civil 
society activity continues to be considered weak and 
ineffective, or irrelevant. Local donors did support 
NGO activity but quietly or anonymously, in order 
to avoid unpredictable government reaction.
But the mostly apolitical and youth-oriented 
groups, many of them lacking official registration, 
capitalized on the rapid spread of the Internet in 
Armenia to gain public support for their causes 
ranging from environmental issues to chronic abuses 
within the armed forces. They were thus emerging as 
a more vocal and, in many cases, effective alternative 
to established non-governmental organizations. 
The Internet enabled ad-hoc groups to attract the 
attention of the mainstream media and quickly 
mobilize sympathizers despite a lack of financial 
resources.
The online activism has gone as far as to question  
the moral authority of the Armenian Apostolic 
Church and its supreme head, Catholicos Karekin 
II. Scores of people joined in June and July a 
Facebook group demanding the partriarch’s 
resignation over his perceived failure to look after 
medieval Armenian monasteries and other alleged 
missteps. The church’s Mother See in Echmiadzin 
had to resort to a public relations campaign, usually 
absent in Armenia, in response to respond to the  
unprecedented campaign.
Non-combat deaths in the Armenian army are 
another case in point. The problem, endemic since 
the early 1990s, has had a much greater public 
resonance since the summer of 2010, and the 
social media is a major reason for that. Faced with 
mounting public uproar, the Armenian military has 
repeatedly promised a tougher crackdown on hazing 
and other abuses within the army ranks. Dozens 
of officers and soldiers have been arrested, fired or 
demoted over the past year. 
Still, some three dozen non-combat deaths were 
reported in 2011. The decreased numbers may be 
due to greater transparency. At the same time, once 
made public, the same transparency does not result 
in information on the actual causes and perpetrators 
of the crimes.
Mostly apolitical and youth-oriented 
groups capitalized on the rapid 
spread of  the Internet in Armenia 
to gain public support for their causes
Civic activists joined parents of some of the dead 
soldiers in staging weekly demonstrations outside 
the prime minister’s office in Yerevan in September. 
They demanded urgent government action against 
army criminality and accused military prosecutors 
of continuing to cover up many such cases. Defense 
Minister Seyran Ohanian met and reassured the 
protesters.
Hrayr Karapetian, the chairman of the National 
Assembly’s Commission on Defense and Security, 
added his voice to the criticism, saying that the 
military authorities are still not doing enough to 
address the problem. Karapetian, who is a senior 
member of the opposition ARF, said more radical 
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defense reforms are needed to eliminate its root 
causes.
Armenia has already been reforming its armed 
forces under the Individual Partnership Action 
Plan (IPAP) with NATO. Launched in 2005, 
the cooperation framework commits Yerevan to 
bringing them into greater conformity with NATO 
standards and practices. The IPAP’s most recent 
version calls for “maximum transparency” in defense 
planning and budgeting and an “adequate mix” of 
civilian and military personnel within the Armenian 
Defense Ministry.
Faced with a mounting public 
uproar, the Armenian military 
has repeatedly promised a tougher 
crackdown on hazing and other 
abuses within the army ranks
Speaking at an annual meeting of NATO’s North 
Atlantic Council in Brussels in July, Ohanian 
announced that the Armenian government has 
drawn up a new five-year plan for defense reforms. 
He said the plan is the result of a strategic review 
of Armenia’s military capabilities and security 
challenges, conducted by the government earlier 
in 2010. Ohanian’s first deputy, Davit Tonoyan, 
discussed the results of that assessment with senior 
U.S. Department of Defense officials during a visit 
to Washington earlier. The Armenian Defense 
Ministry said the two sides mapped out “new areas 
of further cooperation” between the American and 
Armenian militaries.  
 
Although those in the defense establishment insist 
that the reform-minded form a very small minority, 
still, Armenia’s armed forces cooperate with the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) Yerevan office to introduce 
and reinforce reforms leading to democratic and 
civilian control over the security services. This 
includes strengthening the National Assembly’s 
oversight of defense administration, improving the 
army’s understanding of human rights, trying to 
comprehend the causes of ill behavior and assist in 
implementing reforms, focusing on education for 
the leadership especially. The accountability issue 
still needs to be addressed, so that punitive actions 
are taken more adequately and with transparency.  
 
Democratizing police services and improving 
relations between police and the public will be 
essential during the next two pre and post election 
seasons. The public’s interaction with the police 
was the least analyzed and most explosive aspect 
of the 2008 post-election violence, and will be of 
paramount importance again.
The OSCE is involved in helping the administration 
of Armenia’s police and bringing Armenia’s public 
order management strategies, tactics and techniques 
in line with international best practices and 
focusing on the introduction of democratic policing 
practices.
In 2011, there was an upsurge in libel cases brought 
against Armenian newspapers and other media 
outlets mostly critical of the government. That 
was the widely anticipated result of amendments 
to Armenian media-related legislation passed by 
the National Assembly in March 2010. Those 
amendments decriminalized libel offenses but 
toughened financial sanctions for defamation of 
character. Media watchdogs expressed concern at 
the time that this could make it easier for authorities 
to curb press freedom. In fact, 12 such cases were 
reported in the first quarter of 2011 alone.
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In one case, three of Armenia’s wealthiest 
businessmen, all members of the National Assembly, 
filed in January a lawsuit against the opposition 
daily Haykakan Zhamanak over an October 2010 
article that implicated them (along with President 
Sargsyan) in criminal activity in Russia. The 
plaintiffs found it libelous, demanding a total of 7.5 
million dram in damages. A Yerevan court ordered 
Haykakan Zhamanak in February to pay them six 
million dram. Other newspapers and NGOs in the 
journalism community helped raise the funds. 
Two other newspapers highly critical of the 
government, Zhamanak and Hraparak, were taken 
to court by family members of former President 
Kocharian and both fined. Zhamanak was fined 
three million dram and Hraparak six million Dram.
Hraparak was also sued by the head of Armenia’s 
Judicial Departmen for a report on a collective 
letter by the agency’s employees accusing their 
boss of corruption. In September, a Yerevan court 
controversially froze three million Dram of the 
newspaper’s assets and banned it from writing about 
the litigation pending a verdict in the case. 
Another district court slapped a more modest fine 
of 288,000 Dram on the Yerkir daily in June for a 
disparaging article about a wealthy businessman 
and National Assembly deputy notorious for rarely 
attending parliament sessions. 
The lawsuits prompted serious concern from the 
Armenian Chamber of Advocates. Reporters 
Without Borders also expressed serious concern 
about the defamation cases. In a May statement, the 
Paris-based watchdog said the heavy fines imposed 
on media “threaten their survival and create a 
climate that encourages self-censorship.”   
There were few other major changes in the 
Armenian media landscape in the course of the 
year, with the government maintaining its decisive 
influence on political news coverage by virtually all 
local broadcasters. The New York-based Committee 
to Protect Journalists (CPJ) deplored that situation 
in its annual Attacks on the Press report released in 
February. The CPJ also criticized amendments to an 
Armenian law on broadcasting which were passed in 
2010 despite strong domestic and Western criticism. 
It echoed a widely held belief that the amendments 
(which regulate the broadcast digitization process) 
were primarily aimed at keeping the independent 
TV station A1+ off the air and pulling the plug on 
an independent broadcaster, GALA TV,  in 2015. 
Indeed, both applied and both were rejected.
In 2011, there was an upsurge in 
libel cases brought against Armenian 
newspapers and other media outlets 
mostly critical of  the government
In June, the Council of Europe’s top decision- 
making body, the Committee of Ministers, found 
that the Armenian government had fully complied 
with the letter of a European Court of Human 
Rights verdict on the closure of A1+. Armenia’s 
leading media associations slammed the decision for 
ignoring the spirit of the European Court’s decision. 
That decision required the Armenian government 
to pay a 20,000 Euro ($28,500) fine for having shut 
down the broadcaster in 2002 and for subsequent 
rejections of A1+ applications for new broadcasting 
licenses.  However, it did not explicitly order the 
Armenian authorities to allow A1+ to resume 
broadcasts. Thus, the 2011 Council of Ministers 
upheld that the Armenian government followed the 
letter of the verdict. 
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The closure of A1+ is the main reason why the US 
human rights group Freedom House has described 
the Armenian media as “not free” since 2003.
In late October, the Gyumri-based GALA had 
to remove its transmitter from the city’s old TV 
tower after finally losing a lengthy court battle with 
the Gyumri municipality. The latter accused the 
small TV channel of using the facility illegally in 
2008. Nevertheless, GALA was allowed to place its 
transmitter on Gyumri’s new TV tower which is 
used by other local broadcasters. GALA should be 
able to do so until its broadcasting license expires, 
ostensibly because of the digitization process, in 
2015.
There were few other major changes 
in the Armenian media landscape 
in the course of  the year, with the 
government maintaining its decisive 
influence on political news coverage 
by virtually all local broadcasters. 
Also in October, the Gyumri-based Asparez 
Journalists’ Club launched Armenia’s sole daily 
newspaper based outside Yerevan after receiving 
an 18 million Dram grant from the Open Society 
Foundations. The paper called “Gyumri Asparez” 
started out with a print run of 500 copies a day.
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe, in a draft resolution circulated in 
September, said that despite its repeated calls, 
Armenia’s leadership had failed to ensure more 
pluralism in the Armenian broadcast media. 
With parliamentary and presidential elections 
on the horizon, there seems little prospect for the 
easing of the government grip on TV and radio 
stations. Instead, the government continues to 
tolerate the much greater diversity in the print and 
online media. However, the impact of Armenian 
newspapers on public opinion remains seriously 
limited by low circulation numbers. Print runs 
are not rising because readership is limited due 
to the overt political partisanship displayed by 
each publication, and newspapers continue to 
exhibit a lack of comprehensive reporting. Another 
important factor is the rapid expansion of online 
news services. Falling Internet prices and growing 
speed of connections have transformed a couple of 
dozen Internet sites into key sources of information 
for the public. Still, they lack the editorial 
infrastructure that will be necessary for serious 
coverage of elections, for example.
According to a survey by the Caucasus Research 
Resource Centers released in October, 28 percent 
of Armenian households now have an Internet 
connection, up from 21 percent in 2010 and 8 
percent in 2009. The survey also suggested that 
21 percent of Armenians use computers on a daily 
basis. More than 80 percent of those accessing 
information from the Internet were found to trust, 
to varying degrees, Armenian online news services.
OUTLOOK
The discontent expressed in Russia following the 
December Parliamentary election there will impact 
Armenia.
Although public dissatisfaction in Armenia has 
been visible only following presidential elections 
(1996, 2003 and 2008) and not after parliamentary 
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elections, 2012 may be different. Expectations of 
both 2012 and the 2013 presidential elections are 
so high, and the likely impact of the first on the 
second is so obvious, that unfair and illegal actions 
in the 2012 elections, especially those taken with 
impunity, will present larger problems for the 
authorities. 
 
The opposition insists that the authorities still lack 
the political will to hold free and fair elections so 
long as they run the risk of losing power.
The Republican Party will continue to push the 
Prosperous Armenia Party to enter the election 
together on a combined slate. If Prosperous 
Armenia does not manage to resist the pressure and 
succumbs, then a Republican-Prosperous-Rule of 
Law coalition will assure a majority and Armenia’s 
National Assembly will still not serve as a check and 
balance.
Alliances among the opposition groupings are 
unlikely. Two of the three opposition groups – the 
Armenian National Congress and the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation - Dashnaktsutyun, will 
probably each run its own late. The Heritage Party 
may join forces with the liberal Free Democrats who 
splintered off the Armenian National Congress.
The NGO community and civic activists will be 
faced with expectations of greater engagement 
before and during the elections.
News sources, especially television broadcasters, will 
be under greater pressure and will therefore resort to 
self-imposed limits or self-censorship to follow the 
expected line in support of the authorities. Those 
in opposition will be at a disadvantage in terms of 
media access.
ANTICIPATING SPRING
POLICY OPTIONS
The Parliamentary election of May 2012 will be 
the first national election to be held since the 2008 
presidential race which was followed by civil unrest 
and political violence. The distrust that deepened as 
a consequence of those elections and the subsequent 
events remains entrenched between government 
and people, and within society itself. Expectations 
of the results of the May elections will be that they 
are perceived to be a true expression of the voice of 
the people.
Given the public’s high expectations regarding 
parliamentary elections, especially in the context 
of developments in Russia, in the European 
institutions, and given the  promises regularly 
being made by Armenia’s top leaders at European 
podiums, the unfair conduct of parliamentary 
elections will critically undermine Armenia-
EU relations. The government must resist using 
administrative and other resources and demonstrate 
the seriousness of Armenia’s European commitment. 
The government should not fear releasing controls 
on electronic media and provide access even earlier 
than the legally-mandated campaign period, thus 
broadening debate
To allow non-governmental organizations to grow 
stronger and become more independent in their 
programs and activities, the government should 
begin to reward charitable contributors with tax 
advantages. 
 
The police must not just be forced to work on 
public order management reform but also be willing 
to publicly demonstrate work on public order 
management reform to inspire confidence.
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The military prosecutor’s  apparatus needs to be 
overhauled. Deaths in the army, although decreased 
significantly, will remain at the forefront of 
public attention, and therefore should remain the 
Defense Ministry’s focus to demonstrate improved 
transparency and accountability. 
Civil society activists should begin to focus on 
policy development as well, and not only on events 
or interventions.
ANTICIPATING SPRING
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The dominant challenge in 2011 
for the global economy was the 
debt problem, both in the euro 
zone and in the US.
This prompted most euro zone 
countries to adopt austerity mea-
sures. Those in the periphery did 
so to avoid catastrophe; those in 
the core rushed to take preven-
tive measures, and in the process 
raised the specter of  economic 
slowdown and even recession. In 
its end-of-the-year economic out-
look, the OECD slashed its 2012 
forecast for economic growth for 
its 34 member states from 2.3 per-
cent mid-year to 1.6 percent and 
for Europe alone from 2 percent 
to 0.2 percent.
Indeed, towards the end of the year, the challenge 
for advanced economies remained on the one 
hand, adopting a credible strategy to reduce their 
fiscal deficit over the medium and long term, and 
at the same time dealing urgently with slow growth 
and high unemployment. For emerging market 
economies, the expectation continued to be that 
they play a role in helping to achieve the re-balance 
of the global economy by relying more on domestic 
demand.
In 2011, the Armenian economy, too, struggled 
to recover from the deep recession of 2009, and to 
overcome the continuing repercussions of that year’s 
14.5 percent GDP loss. Towards the end of the year, 
Moody’s Investors Service lowered its outlook on 
Armenia’s sovereign ratings from stable to negative, 
pointing to risks to the country’s growth.
Armenia in 2011 faced the same economic 
challenges, albeit on a different scale, as the rest 
of the world. The Armenian government, too, 
was compelled to find ways to navigate “the twin 
threats of undermining credibility and undercutting 
recovery” in the face of high national debt 
accumulated in the first years of the global crisis and 
its subsequent struggle to recover.
In 2011, as in 2010, government policies targeted 
economic growth and poverty reduction, fiscal 
and debt sustainability, lowering the trade deficit, 
managing inflation and deepening structural reforms.
The simultaneous tackling of these challenges 
however have created several dilemmas for the 
government. For example, addressing the national 
debt and the budget deficit requires actions which 
go counter to the steps required to foster growth 
and to reduce poverty. The second dilemma  – 
addressing external imbalances – among other 
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things, assumes a devaluation of the Armenian 
dram. This would go counter to efforts to restrain 
inflation. The third dilemma is that the nature and 
scope of structural reforms that are necessary today, 
on the face of it, contradict the interests of the 
few politically-connected large businessmen who 
control a large portion of Armenia’s economy.
In the absence of a truly free market economy – an 
even playing field, open and fair competition and 
protection of private property – those dilemmas 
cannot be overcome. 
In 2011, the government adopted a restrictive fiscal 
and monetary policy. First, it focused on inflation 
containment and fulfilling budgetary requirements, 
rather than securing economic growth. The Central 
Bank’s policy rate was raised several times, as were 
reserve requirements on foreign liabilities. Second, 
additional revenues were secured not at the expense 
of the shadow economy but at the expense of small 
and medium size enterprises. 
2011 figures show that in 2010, the 
incidence, the gap and the severity 
of  poverty increased as compared to 
2008
During the year, despite rearrangement of excise 
taxes and broadening the tax base, the revenue  
to GDP ratio went up a mere 0.4 percent and 
Armenia continues to have the lowest ratio in 
the region. Third, despite the promise and effort 
devoted to diversification, the economy remained 
heavily dependent on the mining and agriculture 
sectors. Finally, structural reforms to induce greater 
productivity and competitiveness by reducing 
patronage and corruption were ineffective.
As we close the year, Armenia’s growth is uneven 
and anemic. For most of the year, inflation was still 
higher than the Central Bank target, there was high 
poverty, high national debt and high trade deficit. 
 
THE ECONOMIC PICTURE
On the threshold of the second wave of the global 
economic crisis, little was resolved regarding the 
fundamental causes which brought on Armenia’s 
2009 economic decline. Armenia still faces the 
same old bottlenecks – the lack of economic 
diversification, growing dependence on resource-
oriented exports, and a growing external debt. In 
2011, Armenia, with another unlearned lesson from 
2009, is still very vulnerable to external economic 
shocks.
After a sharp downturn in 2009 followed by a 
moderate recovery in 2010, represented by 2.1 
percent GDP growth, 2011 is expected to see 4.6 
percent economic growth by year’s end. In absolute 
numbers, the 2011 Gross Domestic Product  is 
3,763 billion dram (or USD $10 billion.) However, 
the first half of 2011 registered only 2.8 percent 
GDP growth compared to the same period in 2010. 
In contrast, the GDP growth rate in the first half of 
2010 reached 6.1 percent.
According to the Central Bank, 2011 was marked 
by rising consumer confidence but a worsening 
business climate and stagnating economic activity. 
Indeed, the economic activity index has barely 
changed since last year, registering, in the third 
quarter of 2011, a slight decrease of 0.1 percent 
compared to the second quarter of 2011. Overall, 
economic activity demonstrated a rather unstable 
pattern this year, reflecting the low level of 
economic diversification and thus the seasonality 
of the economic buoyancy. In month to month 
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comparisons, between 2011 and 2010, May saw 
a 9.9 growth in economic activity, and June saw a 
mere 2.3 percent. In July, it was seven percent, in 
August 9.6, in September, nine, and in October 2.4 
percent. The rise in economic activity was largely 
caused by growth in services and a rebound in the 
agricultural and industrial sectors. Conversely, 
trade and construction did not show significant 
improvement this year.
Inflation concerns – although temporally eased by 
seasonal price reductions on agricultural products 
– still remained high. The month-to-month average 
inflation rate from January to October stood at 
8.3 percent, considerably exceeding the Central 
Bank inflation target set at 4 with plus or minus 
1.5 percent. Moreover, food and beverages were hit 
the hardest, fueled by soaring prices on eggs, dairy 
products, sugar and fruits, inflating by 12.3 percent 
over the period. This, in turn, further worsened 
conditions for the poor, whose consumption basket 
is comprised largely (up to 69 percent) of food 
products.
Gains in economic growth during the so-called 
recovery year of 2010 were not distributed evenly, 
leading to further polarization of Armenia’s 
population. Thus, the Gini coefficient for 
consumption inequality and the coefficient for 
income inequality rose significantly during the last 
two years. In 2010, those numbers reached 0.265 
and 0.362 respectively. Further, at the national 
level, the richest 10 percent of the population did 
not suffer from recession, whereas the poorest 
10 percent suffered more than the others, thus 
increasing the gap between the richest and the 
poorest even further. Just released figures show that 
in 2010 the richest made 14.2 times more and spent 
8.1 times more than the poorest. In two years, the 
Gini coefficient for consumption increased by 10 
percent, while the income inequality coefficient rose 
by 7 percent.
2011 figures show that in 2010, the incidence, 
the gap and the severity of poverty increased as 
compared to 2008. More than one-third of the 
Armenian population – 35.8 percent – today lives 
in poverty, and 21.3 percent of the total population 
is considered ‘very poor.’ The third level, the 
‘extremely poor,’ is three percent of the population 
(versus 1.6 percent in 2008) and lives on less than 
$2 a day. 
The recovery in 2010 and the 
expected economic growth in 2011 
did not bring with it any recovery to 
the labor market
In just the last two years, around 270,000 people 
became poor, raising the number of those living 
on less than 33,500 dram (or $90) per month to 
1.2 million. The number of the ‘very poor’ soared 
to 694,000 people. The severity of poverty was 
estimated to comprise around 98,000 people in 
2010. Given that the cost of the basic consumer 
basket is around 42,000 dram, those who are 
considered above the poverty line because they earn 
around 33,500 dram remain at risk.  Moreover, 
over 54 percent of the poor live in households 
where more than two family members are in fact 
employed, yet the family is still below the poverty 
line. 
The recovery in 2010 and the expected economic 
growth in 2011 did not bring with it any 
recovery to the labor market. The unemployment 
CRIPPLING GROWTH
40
THE CIVILITAS FOUNDATION ARMENIA  2011
rate, as calculated by International Labor 
Organizationmethodology, has increased and 
reaches 19 percent. In other words, according to 
the ILO, of those Armenians able to work, and of 
working age, one of five does not have a job. This 
brings the total number of unemployed to roughly 
278,000. Around 38 percent of the unemployed 
have never worked and 19 percent of the 
unemployed have now been out of work for more 
than four years. Over these two years, the value 
of the minimal consumer basket has soared by 18 
percent to reach 42,000 dram while unemployment 
benefits have remained unchanged at 18,000 dram 
(less than $50.)
Armenia has improved its position 
both in the World Bank Doing 
Business ranking and on the 
World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness scale this year
On the other hand, Armenia has improved 
its position both in the World Bank Doing 
Business ranking and on the World Economic 
Forum Global Competitiveness scale this year. 
In terms of ease of doing business, Armenia was 
rated six points higher than the previous year. 
Improvements were observed in the process 
of attaining construction permits, paying 
taxes and getting credit. As regards the Global 
Competitiveness Index, Armenia advanced its 
ranking by six positions from 98 to 92. According 
to the World Economic Forum, Armenia 
improved in 10 out of 12 categories, performing 
increasingly well in labor market efficiency.
At the same time, Moody’s Investors Service 
lowered its outlook on Armenia from stable to 
negative. Moody’s explained its decision based on 
the country’s ongoing economic vulnerability to 
weaker growth prospects in Europe and Russia, 
which together account for 58 percent of Armenia’s 
export market. Moody’s also noted that the country 
is now faced with a large current account deficit 
(estimated to be 11 percent of GDP in 2011) and 
a government external debt ratio that has doubled 
to 35 percent in 2011 from 14 percent of GDP in 
2008. 
No changes were registered in Transparency 
International’s corruption perception score. In 2011, 
the score retained its earlier level, 2.6 points, putting 
Armenia in 129th place out of 183 countries.  
After the severe downturn in the construction 
sector, the hardest hit of all sectors by the 
global financial crisis, in 2011 the sector still 
remains depressed. Worse, construction figures 
are not only far behind those of the pre-crisis 
level, but they are decreasing further. In the 
period January to October, construction output 
dropped around 25 percent compared to the 
same period in the previous year. Moreover,  40 
percent of the sector was financed by the state 
and international organizations, or supported 
by humanitarian aid. This was insufficient to 
uplift the sector. Additionally, individuals and 
commercial organizations were reluctant to invest 
in construction, contributing less than 60 percent 
to the development of the sector. In pre-crisis 
Armenia, commercial and residential construction 
constituted 89 percent of the sector, reflecting 
increasing returns from investment. Agreements 
with the Asian Development Bank and the World 
Bank to implement major infrastructure projects 
promise to reinvigorate the field next year.
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Armenia’s industrial sector achieved impressive 
growth this year, shooting up by around 20 
percent in the first 10 months. A large portion 
of the registered growth was boosted by higher 
metal prices on the international market, and thus 
does not reflect the real growth of the sector. If 
calculated based on constant prices, industrial 
output grew only 13 percent. The mining sector 
and related industries again became the primary 
driver of the growth. The share of mining and base 
metal production in the industrial sector increased 
further and now constitutes 34 percent. The export-
oriented nature of both of these industries and, 
consequently, the rising dependence on resource-
heavy exports, further increases the vulnerability of 
the local economy to external fluctuations. 
Agriculture was the savior of Armenia’s economy 
this year. If the 13.4 decline in agriculture in 2010 
put the brakes on GDP growth, this year, that 
same agricultural sector performed better and 
contributed to economic activity. Good weather 
helped make a rebound of around 15 percent in 
the first nine months of 2011. Data on agricultural 
lands also demonstrates that agricultural growth was 
mainly conditioned by the climate. 
Agriculture, although one of Armenia’s 
most important economic sectors, remains 
underfinanced. Supported by the government’s 
March decision to allocate 200 million dram to 
subsidize four percentage points on loans to farmers, 
agricultural loan portfolios went up 18 billion 
dram or 34 percent in the first ten months of 2011. 
Approximately 7.3 billion dram in loans were made 
available under this program. Yet, agricultural loans 
comprise a mere 6.2 percent of total bank loans. 
Given that agriculture comprises over 18 percent 
of GDP and employs approximately 45 percent of 
the labor force, this share of agricultural loans in 
commercial banks’ portfolios is disproportionately 
low. Consumer loans, on the other hand, have 
increased by 38 billion dram and constitute 18 
percent of total bank loans. Although interest 
rates on both categories of loans are the same – 
approximately 24 percent – commercial banks 
clearly prefer to loan to consumers, considering the 
agricultural sector to be high risk.
The weather is not the only risk factor for Armenian 
agriculture. The reluctance of commercial banks 
to invest in agriculture is, to a great extent, 
conditioned by unpredictability and the short-
term nature of the policies applied to the sector. 
Moreover, dominated by small-scale subsistence-
driven agriculture, the sector is producing far below 
its capacity. In fact, the value added per worker 
in agriculture is on average five times less than in 
developed countries. An average farmer household 
in Armenia produces around $4,000 a year, which 
is barely enough for subsistence. However, rather 
than creating long-term programs and mechanisms 
to increase the productivity of the sector and to 
reduce the risk both for farmers and investors, the 
government has chosen to take the quick path by 
subsidizing high interest rates and obliging banks to 
enter the agricultural loan sector.
Construction figures are not only far 
behind those of  the pre-crisis level, 
but they are decreasing further
Retail turnover continued to grow this year, 
showing albeit a steady, but slow increase. Overall, 
retail sales growth averaged 2.8 percent by the end 
of the third quarter of 2011 compared with the 
same period the previous year. This was mainly 
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attributed to a substantial 65 percent increase of the 
total official turnover in shops and supermarkets, 
in the January to October period. Share of large 
supermarkets as percentage of total retail sales 
constituted over 52 percent, whereas turnover in 
mid-size outlets decreased to 22.4 percent.
Driven by aggressive marketing strategies and a 
lottery based on cash register receipts (launched by 
the State Revenue Committee with the intention 
of bringing grocery stores out of the shadows) 
the total turnover of shops and supermarkets 
comprised around 624 billion dram in the first 
10 months of 2011. The lottery initiative may 
have considerably decreased the share of the 
shadow economy in retail, yet the market is still 
highly monopolized and run by large, politically-
connected businessmen.
Agriculture, although one of  
Armenia’smost important economic 
sectors, remains underfinanced
The combined services sector saw a slight 
acceleration in the growth rate this year, reaching 
5.8 percent in the January to September period. 
Despite consistent growth over the last decade, 
services still account for less than 30 percent 
of average monthly household expenditures 
(compared to 70 percent in the developed world.)
Over two-thirds of transactions in the services 
sector are in the financial sphere, transport, 
information technologies and communications. 
Yet, even these areas have not fully exploited 
their capacities and in terms of productivity still 
lag considerably behind developed countries. An 
IT specialist in Armenia, for example, produces, 
on average, 3.2 times less than a Singaporean 
programmer and 2.8 times less than an Israeli IT 
professional.
Overall, the Information and Communication 
Technologies sector was one of the most rapidly 
growing segments of Armenia’s economy. From 
2008 to 2010,  the industry revenues grew by 34 
percent and by the end of 2010 comprised around 
USD $149 million.  Moreover, the widespread 
introduction of relatively inexpensive broadband 
and wireless internet providers, caused partially 
by the introduction of a third mobile company, 
substantially increased the number of internet users. 
In  2010,  the  number  of  broadband  subscribers 
reached 200,000, while the overall number of 
wireless internet users is around 100,000. Mobile 
GSM networks cover about 85 percent of the 
country’s territory and 95 percent of the population. 
3G is used by only 3 percent of Armenia’s residents.
Fueled by the launch of mandatory automobile 
liability insurance and the resultant expansion of 
the insurance market, the financial sector enjoyed 
one of the fastest growth rates within the service 
sector.
One of the most promising sectors of the Armenian 
economy – the tourism sector – continued to 
enjoy double digit growth this year. The number 
of tourists visiting Armenia in the first three 
quarters of 2011 was already 13.1 percent more 
than in the same period last year, reaching 552,000 
travelers, and expected to hit 800,000 by year’s end. 
Moreover, the number of those staying in hotels 
nearly doubled in the January to September period, 
consequently yielding a noticeable growth in sales 
in the hotel sector. The number of available hotel 
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rooms has also jumped, recording near 20 percent 
growth over the same period.
Europeans represented the fastest growing inbound 
markets for Armenia’s tourism industry. In the 
period January to September the number of visitors 
from European countries soared 2.4 times, reaching 
39.3 percent of the total number of tourists staying 
in hotels.
The main source countries of arrivals to Armenia 
are Russia (17 percent), the US (15 percent), Iran 
(11 percent) and France (10 percent) with the 
share of the Diaspora in the total number of arrivals 
estimated at over 60 percent.
However, the increase in numbers of tourists 
has not meant a commensurate improvement in 
tourism infrastructure throughout the country. 
Only Yerevan, and more and more Tsaghkadzor, 
too, have emerged as a reliable hub for inbound 
tourism, while the regions lack strategic tourism 
development and therefore do not have access to 
the necessary resources. Sevan and Dilijan still lack 
a service-oriented tourism plan. Jermuk has one but 
it is far from having the necessary infrastructure. 
Only in Armenia’s south, in Syunik, near the newly 
constructed Tatev skyline, is there a systematic 
effort to develop an integrated approach to tourism. 
In 2011, in the Tourism Competitiveness Index, 
commissioned by the World Economic Forum, 
Armenia was ranked 90 among 139 countries, one 
position higher than the previous assessment. At 
the same time, the neighbors fared better. Georgia 
was ranked 73, Azerbaijan 83 and Turkey 50. Only 
Iran was given an overall ranking of 114. While 
Armenia scored relatively high in the areas of 
qualified labor availability and the quality of health 
and hygiene, Armenia’s tourism industry was ranked 
far less competitive when it came to environmental 
sustainability, natural resources, information and 
communication technologies, air and ground 
transport infrastructure.
The direct contribution of the tourism sector to 
GDP is expected to reach 66.4 billion dram (1.8 
percent of total GDP) in 2011. Yet, despite the 
industry being called a government priority, official 
budget allocation for tourism promotion in 2011 
constituted 50 million dram, or 0.005 percent 
of total budget expenses. Whether this budget 
is measured in absolute numbers, in relation to 
country size or in relation to population, Armenia 
ranks near the bottom among all the countries in 
the world.
An average farmer household in 
Armenia produces around $4,000 
a year, which is barely enough for 
subsistence
External trade saw a 16.6 percent increase in 
the first  three quarters of 2011 compared to 
the previous year. Imports were three times the 
amount of exports. The trade deficit value over the 
same period reached around $2 billion. Despite a 
slight decrease in its share of trade in the January 
to September period, Russia remained Armenia’s 
top trading partner, accounting for roughly one 
fifth of all foreign trade. Over the same period, 
trade turnover with the European Union surged 
further, this time by 22.8 percent to reach, by 
the end of the third quarter, 33.6 percent of total 
external trade. There was a general improvement 
in trade turnover within the region in 2011, 
CRIPPLING GROWTH
44
THE CIVILITAS FOUNDATION ARMENIA  2011
with trade with Iran reaching 6.1 percent and 4.3 
percent with Turkey. Oddly, trade with Georgia 
next door, constitutes only 2.2 percent of overall 
trade, while trade with China is 7.3 percent -- 
more than that with any of Armenia’s immediate 
neighbors. Trade with US was 4.6 percent of 
the total. The remaining trading partners are the 
countries of the CIS, as well as, among others, 
Israel, Brazil and Switzerland. 
This year, as in 2010, exports grew three times faster 
than imports. Fueled by price increases on metals 
and mining products which constitute Armenia’s 
major exports, the export growth rate reached 33.5 
percent in the first nine months of 2011. Despite 
the huge change in export volumes, the structure of 
external trade saw almost no change. Exports still 
are highly concentrated in polished diamonds, base 
metals, mining and mineral products. Indeed, this 
group of resource-intensive products represented 
over 75 percent of exports in the first three quarters 
of 2011. 
The number of  tourists visiting 
Armenia in the first three quarters 
of  2011 was already 13.1 percent 
more than in the same period last 
year
Conversely, the main imports to Armenia are energy 
products, machinery and transport equipment. In 
total, they comprise over 42 percent of the total 
imports. Trade is now vulnerable to weak global 
demand and Armenia is particularly affected as it 
relies heavily on exports to Russia, where economic 
demand is itself a hostage of oil prices. Demand 
from Armenia’s other major trading partner, the 
European Union, is also subject to changes brought 
on by the crisis. 
Overall, despite the impressive growth of Armenia’s 
foreign trade, the rising trade deficit will eventually 
pose a serious burden and threaten the Armenian 
economy. Moreover, the dependence on non-
diversified low value-added resource-intensive 
exports renders the country highly vulnerable to 
external price shocks.
Private transfers to Armenia increased by 15 
percent. Three-fourths of remittances flow from 
Russia and the increase can be explained by 
increases in oil prices which are the major drivers 
of economic development there. According to 
Armenia’s Central Bank, there is a direct correlation 
between oil prices and the amount of remittances 
to Armenia. As in the pre-crisis period, the 
biggest share of private transfers was channeled 
into consumer spending rather than into value-
added sectors. Private transfers to Armenia had 
only indirect impact on the development of local 
industries, by raising demand. 
Increased exports coupled with private transfers led 
to volatility in the dram exchange rate. The Central 
Bank stated a commitment to a floating exchange 
rate and still intervened in the currency market to 
prevent sharp fluctuations. Between January and 
September 2011, the dram depreciated by two 
percent. The average exchange rate in September 
was 372.3 dram to 1 USD.  
In 2011, the Central Bank’s monetary policy 
targeted inflation, which in the beginning of the 
year comprised 10.3 percent. Throughout the 
first trimester, the Central Bank implemented a 
CRIPPLING GROWTH
45
THE CIVILITAS FOUNDATIONARMENIA  2011
policy of expensive money and increased the policy 
rate by 1.25 points up to 8.5 percent. However, 
inflation still remained high at nine percent in May. 
The inflation rate declined significantly only in 
July and August, mainly due to reduced prices on 
agricultural products. The attempts to restrain the 
supply-driven inflation using monetary tools proved 
to be ineffective.
Moreover, the strict monetary policy of the Central 
Bank along with the devaluation of the national 
currency increased risks to the banking system. 
Throughout the first nine months of this year, the 
share of foreign currencies in the total loan portfolio 
of the banking system increased by 2.5 percent, 
reaching 60 percent. So, while the monetary 
policy of the Central Bank created incentives for 
entrepreneurs to obtain loans in foreign currency, 
the devaluation of the dram placed the burden 
of risks squarely on the shoulders of businesses. 
The high policy rate had little impact on deposits. 
The share of foreign currencies in total deposits 
decreased by one percent, but still comprising a 
rather high 68 percent.
In 2011, tax revenues (including obligatory social 
payments) are expected to grow by 20 percent and 
the budget deficit is not to surpass 3.9 percent. 
In comparison, in 2010, the budget deficit of 
Armenia comprised five percent of GDP, whereas 
the corresponding indicator in 2009 reached 7.6 
percent. Half the budget deficit in 2011 – some 
150 billion dram – are to be financed from internal 
sources, while the rest will be covered by external 
sources, which in its turn will magnify the foreign 
debt. In 2011, the foreign debt is expected to reach 
USD $3.73 billion, comprising 35.5 percent of the 
GDP. In contrast, the corresponding indicators 
in 2010 amounted to USD $3.3 billion or 35.2 
percent of GDP. As privileged terms expire on the 
current loans, servicing the debt will eat up even 
more of the national budget.  As of December 31, 
2010, the average payback period for state debts 
comprised 11.4 years, whereas the corresponding 
indicator for the internal debt was 3.9 years and 
12.6 for the external debt. 
The government’s limitation to borrow on 
concessionary terms from international financial 
institutions obliges it to borrow from local and 
foreign sources at commercial terms. Thus, the 
risks associated with high interest rates increase 
especially since in the government’s debt structure, 
the weight of foreign loans at adjustable rates is 
already very high. In 2009, adjustable rate loans 
were 24.8 percent; in 2011, they formed 26.2 
percent. By 2014, the weighted average can hit 32.6 
percent. According to the Ministry of Finance, if 
international interest rates were to register even 
a one percent rise in adjustable rates, the interest 
payments alone on external debt would increase 
by USD $10 million. And, if in relation to the 
US dollar, there is just a one percent deviation in 
the exchange rate of the IMF’s SDR, the Euro, or 
the Japanese yen, that will affect the government’s 
external debt by USD $23 million.
INSTITUTIONAL MATTERS 
Armenia’s social and political development continues 
to pay the price of unimplemented second-generation 
economic reforms. Fiscal and other structural 
reorganization requires a political will to adopt the 
required legislation and to implement the letter 
and the spirit of that legislation. Heading the list of 
necessary fiscal reforms is always tax compliance, tax 
collection and tax administration. The remaining 
structural reforms address a fair business and 
competitiveness environment.
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In Armenia, those with the competence to tackle 
such essential transformation are the very same 
persons most apt to be affected by the necessary 
shakeup. The officials responsible to bring such 
reforms are indeed those who would be the objects 
of the reforms – from members of the National 
Assembly to heads of ministries and agencies. 
Changes would threaten, or at the very least, limit 
the interests of the entangled business and political 
elite. Such entanglement, already formalized 
although clearly prohibited by law, constitutes the 
eternal impediment to change.
Oddly, trade with Georgia next 
door, constitutes only 2.2 percent of  
overall trade, while trade with China 
is 7.3 percent
In the run-up to elections in 2012 and 2013, it 
would seem essential for those in office to address 
this structural barrier to growth, release the 
controls on the economy, allow small and medium 
size enterprises to flourish and thus improve the 
economic and electoral climate. On the other 
hand, releasing controls means reducing the power 
of monopolies and thus access to revenues for the 
politically connected business elite whose financial 
and political weight is consequential to the funding 
and winning of elections. It is the combined 
institutional power of these groups –enjoying tax 
and customs advantages on the one hand, and 
being allowed to control certain economic sectors 
on the other – that is at the core of the economy’s 
structural weakness.
The most important standard by which to judge 
the success of tax reform and an equitable tax 
administration is if the tax revenue ratio to GDP 
reaches the expected levels – 23 to 25 percent. This 
year, the ratio is expected to increase a mere 0.4 
percent rise, thus approaching 17.27 percent. 
Throughout the first nine months, the sum of tax 
payments collected from the 1000 largest taxpayers 
amounted to 485 billion dram, 75 percent of 
which (352.8 billion dram) came from two huge 
corporations, ArmRosGazProm and the Zangezur 
Copper and Molybdenum Combine. This is a 
larger figure than their tax payments last year by 11 
percent or 34.3 billion dram and can be explained 
by soaring prices of gas and metals in 2011. A full 
40 percent of the increase in tax revenues comes 
from the Zangezur Combinat which paid an 
additional 13.7 billion dram in 2011.
Another achievement of the year was the 
enforcement of the law on Tax Benefits for 
Corporations and Private Entrepreneurs on Tax 
and Other Obligatory Payments. According to the 
law, taxpayers can determine their own schedule 
for paying taxes. Entrepreneurs would be freed 
from tax penalties and fees if they sign and make 
full payment before the due date. The government 
resorted to such ‘tax amnesty’ in order to tackle the 
large amount of the unpaid taxes, which in January 
2010 amounted to over 200 billion dram. Half this 
amount was actual unpaid taxes, the remainder was 
fees and penalties. 
Despite the institutional reforms in the tax sector, 
rules for customs duty calculation remain arbitrary. 
Export procedures, certificates of origin for 
imports, construction permits, business registration, 
and other procedural improvements have been 
simplified.
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Some steps were also noted on the way to 
improvement of the business environment. 
According to government estimates, the number 
of steps needed to receive a construction permit 
will decrease from 20 to seven. Consequently, this 
will decrease the total number of days for starting a 
business from 137 to 27.  
Considerable changes were also made to the law 
on Protection of Economic Competition in 
2011. These included increasing penalties and 
enforcing the rights of the state commission for the 
protection of economic competition. However, 
the commission is still handicapped. While price 
increases on a variety of consumer goods were found 
to be unjustified, the commission did not publish 
the results of its investigation against those abusing 
their market share. Most cases of unfair competition 
are resolved at a level higher than the commission.
The voluntary accumulative pension system, 
was not introduced in 2011, as planned. Despite 
the fact that the government and the Central 
Bank approved most necessary legal acts, they 
did not seem to be in a hurry to produce all the 
documentation for the chosen operators to enter the 
market. The launch delay creates risks for the entire 
pension reform timeline, which  according to plan 
was to have all the problems and risks addressed 
before January 2014, when the mandatory pension 
system was anticipated.  
This year, compulsory motor vehicle insurance went 
into effect. Despite initial widespread skepticism, 
the system appears to be working effectively with 85 
percent of the 430,000 registered vehicles covered 
by insurance. It will take a few years to assess the 
success of the system’s intent to introduce rules, 
predictability and civility in the institutional realm, 
thus influencing similar movement in the health 
insurance sector. However, the other intent – to 
strengthen the financial sector – has met with 
limited or no success.
Thus, the financial market remains 
underdeveloped. Contrary to hopes that obligatory 
car insurance purchases (and voluntary pension 
deposits) would contribute to market development 
for dram instruments, it did not do so, at least 
in this first year. Insurance companies deposited 
the revenues, while the banks went after safer and 
high-yield investments, purchasing government 
bonds (with a coupon rate fluctuating from 11 to 
13.6 percent) rather than providing higher risk 
loans. Furthermore, the Armenian corporations 
because of high government bond yields would not 
issue corporate bonds, which could have been safe 
alternatives as bank investments, while at the same 
time contributing to economic growth.   
 
OUTLOOK
Outlook for the global economy is at best anemic 
growth, and at worst, another decline and a recession. 
The IMF and the OECD, among other international 
organizations, revisited their predictions at year’s end, 
and made downward adjustments.  
Armenia’s own economic projection for next 
year is 4.2 percent growth, but the international 
organizations expect lower, taking into 
consideration global developments. Thus, it will be 
very difficult for Armenia’s government to turn its 
projection into reality.
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If the international projections are correct and there 
is a global slowdown, Armenia will be on shaky 
ground since its macroeconomic foundations are 
much weaker than they were in 2008 when the crisis 
struck. State debt is higher, purchasing power is 
lower, as is FDI.
The EU and Russia are Armenia’s biggest trading 
partners. And if the next slowdown starts with 
the EU, which will inevitably affect Russia, then 
through trade, the impact on Armenia will be 
immediate.
There is unprecedented attention on the 2012 
elections and especially high anticipation of the 
results. On the one hand, this will lead to greater 
government economic activity; on the other 
hand, investors will approach the economy with 
uncertainty and caution.
Given election considerations, the government will 
not undertake serious structural reforms, although 
those decisive actions against political-economic 
entanglement are already crucially late.
POLICY OPTIONS
Institutional and structural reforms ought to be 
priority policy objectives. The absence of notable 
successes this year is evidence that economic 
problems cannot be overcome without essential 
change. Indeed, the IMF year-end statement 
included a rare public disagreement with the 
government, insisting that Armenia can no longer 
afford to tolerate those problems.
Economic growth must be the government’s 
primary and overriding goal; only then should the 
government focus on containing inflation. It is not 
inflation containment that should become policy.
Armenia’s revenue generation remains the poorest 
in the region and must see an improvement. The 
government’s targeted annual 0.4 percent increase in 
the tax to GDP ratio is insufficient and tantamount 
to an admission that reducing shadow activities is 
not the priority.
Following the dram’s controlled depreciation in 
2011, in 2012 it must be allowed to find its normal 
equilibrium, which according to international 
financial organizations means another 10 to 
15 percent loss in value. A true exchange rate 
equilibrium will benefit exports and increase 
the purchasing power of remittances, as well as 
encouraging FDI.
Lack of diversification continues to make Armenia’s 
economy most vulnerable. Despite government 
promises, there was no serious diversification of 
economy; yet that must be a key 2012 target. Areas 
such as tourism which have great growth potential 
require more support, greater promotion and 
will benefit the expansion of small and medium 
enterprises.
The government should take advantage of the EU 
Association Agreement’s opportunity to establish 
the norms and standards necessary to support 
economic competitiveness and efficiency in areas 
that are Armenia’s comparative advantage areas, 
such as agriculture and information technologies. 
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The government must reconfirm its commitment 
to revise the Sustainable Development Program, 
the need for which became apparent following the 
onset of the crisis. A new report is essential and 
must reflect current realities and the government’s 
vision. This must be done quickly to serve as the 
main guiding document for sustainable economic 
development.
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ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN GEORGIA
GDP 
Growth:
4.6 percent
Inflation:
8.8 percent
GDP: 
$10.2 bn
GDP per 
capita:
$3048 
(PPP $5395)
Population:
3.3 m
Regarding Karabakh, the 
authorities will not be able 
to take further steps beyond 
those taken in Kazan. As a 
consequence, no progress 
can be expected.
Armenia will struggle 
economically to rebuild 
its 2009 economic 
losses. Success depends 
on political will and the 
introduction of serious 
political and economic 
reforms. But, given the 
upcoming parliamentary 
and presidential elections, 
political interests will 
probably have priority and 
this decision will be the 
fundamental indicator of 
economic development.  
 
Parliamentary elections will 
be especially competitive, 
regardless of what 
cooperative formats or 
coalitions are formed.  If 
the second major coalition 
party, Prosperous Armenia, 
participates independently 
and successfully in the 
parliamentary elections, a 
new political environment 
can be expected in 
parliament, without a 
monopoly by the ruling 
party and  with new checks 
and balances in the political 
system.
GDP 
Growth:
0.2 percent
Inflation:
9.3 percent
GDP:
$68.5 bn
GDP per 
capita:
$7510  
(PPP 
$10217)
Population:
9.1 m
No elections are 
expected; the same 
imposed quiet and 
stability will continue, 
despite the inevitable 
impact of calls for 
reform in Russia and the 
Middle East. Azerbaijan 
will attempt to use its 
UN Security Council 
seat to disseminate the 
Azerbaijani position 
on the Karabakh issue, 
and will be increasingly 
aggressive in international 
organizations, stressing 
the principle of territorial 
integrity, exclusively.  
 
Despite international 
pressure, Azerbaijan 
will continue with 
both military rhetoric 
and sniper activity on 
the Line of Contact. 
Economically, Azerbaijan 
continues to rely on oil 
resources and will have 
low or medium economic 
growth depending on 
oil prices. On the one 
hand, the beginning 
of the realization of 
the Nabucco pipeline, 
on the other hand, the 
Azerbaijan-Russia gas 
deals will embolden 
Azerbaijan.
GDP  
Growth:
5.5 percent
Inflation:
9.6 percent
GDP: 
$13.8 bn 
 
GDP per 
capita:
$3098 
(PPP $5430)
Population:
4.5 m
A tense domestic political 
situation is to be expected 
in 2012. If the new political 
figure, Boris Ivanishvili 
succeeds in rallying 
opposition around him, 
they can pose a serious 
challenge to President 
Saakashvili’s rule at the 
2012 parliamentary 
elections. Georgia-Russia 
relations will remain tense. 
Georgia will continue to 
focus on NATO and EU 
integration, aiming to have 
new achievements to show 
in time for the October 
elections.  
 
Despite the continuation 
of amicable talk between 
Armenia and Georgia, 
beneath the surface 
differences will remain 
and deepen, in security 
alliances, and regarding the 
socioeconomic situation 
in Javakhketi. Although 
both sides speak of deeper 
integration between the 
two countries, each, for 
different reasons will 
not pursue the tangible 
expressions of such 
integration.
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RUSSIA TURKEY IRAN
GDP 
Growth:
4.3 percent
Inflation: 
8.9 percent
GDP:
$1884 bn 
GDP per 
capita:
$13236 
(PPP  
$16687)
Population:
142.4 m
The ruling United 
Russia Party’s inability 
to win a majority 
in Russia’s year-end 
parliamentary elections 
was a wake-up call. 
Although this does 
not represent a direct 
threat to Putin’s election 
in March 2012, the 
tendency to challenge 
the reproduction of 
the ruling elite will 
continue and there 
will be real pressure 
on Putin to become a 
reformed Putin. The 
dilemma is to adopt 
some democratic 
reforms without losing 
political power. The 
degree of maneuvering 
space available to 
the rulers and to the 
emerging vocal middle 
class will, in large 
part, depend on the 
international economic 
situation, and chiefly, 
the price of oil.  
 
In 2012, given these 
heightened and public 
expectations for 
democratization, given 
the quickly-evolving 
political complications 
in Syria and Iran, and 
given heightened 
rhetoric in the run-up 
to American elections, 
a certain amount of 
tension between the US 
and Russia is inevitable, 
and this will naturally 
affect this region.
GDP 
Growth:
6.6 percent
Inflation:
6.0 percent
GDP:
$763.1 bn
GDP per 
capita:
$10576 
(PPP 
$14616)
Population:
72.2 m
With expectations of a euro 
zone slowdown in 2012, 
Turkey’s high economic 
growth, too, will be 
affected. Politically, the two 
most important political 
challenges for Turkey in 
2012 will be resolving the 
re-surfaced Kurdish tensions 
and pulling off constitutional 
change. Entering their third 
successive term in office, 
the AK Party has the upper 
hand in its long running 
battle with the army and the 
opposition, but, its reduced 
majority means that further 
progress on reforming the 
1982 constitution will 
have to be negotiated. Or, 
given the prime minister’s 
popularity, he can appeal 
to a popular vote on the 
constitutional changes and be 
assured a victory.  
 
The frustrations of the 
Kurdish minority are also 
resurfacing, sometimes 
violently. Both military and 
legal procedures are being 
used to crush the Kurds 
and their ideological and 
logistical supporters. Turkey 
will continue its active 
engagement in the region. 
EU relations will continue 
to stall, perhaps stagnating 
further when Cyprus takes 
the EU presidency in the 
second half of 2012.
No movement should be 
expected in relations with 
Armenia, either, since no 
progress is expected on the 
Karabakh conflict settlement, 
given the deep deadlock 
on negotiations on the 
one hand, and Armenia’s 
upcoming parliamentary and 
presidential elections, too. 
GDP 
Growth:
2.5 percent
Inflation:
22.5 percent
GDP:
$475.1 bn
GDP per 
capita:
$ 6260  
(PPP 
$12258)
Population:
75.9 m
Iran’s socioeconomic 
problems and resulting 
tensions will persist as will 
deep divisions between the 
presidential team and the 
religious leadership. During 
the 2012 parliamentary 
election process different 
factions will begin to 
reclaim power and potential 
successors to President 
Ahmadinejad will begin 
to emerge. Pressure by the 
international community 
regarding nuclear issues 
will grow. Even in the 
absence of a UN Security 
Council decision, the EU, 
the US and other individual 
countries may impose their 
own sanctions on Iran, 
which will inevitably impact 
Armenia, Georgia and 
Azerbaijan.  
 
Regardless, Armenia-Iran 
political relations will 
remain friendly, but it 
cannot be expected that any 
of the Armenia-Iran projects 
with regional significance 
will be set in motion. 
Changes in Syria will affect 
Iran’s regional influence. 
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